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JOAN W. HOWARTH*

Executing White Masculinities:
Learning from Karla Faye Tucker

G

ender is a constant struggle. 1 Throughout our lives, we
contend with multiple unstable and oppositional social
constructions of gender, or hierarchies of masculinities and femininities. 2 Knowing, or trying to know, who is male and who is
female, and how men and women should act, is a major part of
the structure of our identities, our societies, and our democracy.
These gender questions are not separate from race or class;3 to* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas. I gratefully acknowledge the support for this project I received from the
James E. Rogers Research Fund at UNLV, and from the Center for Social Justice at
Boalt Hall, where I was Scholar-in-Residence during 2000-01. I benefited there
from the excellent research assistance of Jee Park and Liz Garfinkle. I thank Annette Appell and Lynne Henderson for very helpful comments on earlier drafts,
Matthew Wright for superb library assistance, and the organizers of and participants
in this Symposium. I also thank the Oregon Law Review, especially Rick Mellen,
Nicole Huberty, and Nancy Farmer.
I "To the extent that gender is an assignment, it is an assignment which is never
quite carried out according to expectation, whose addressee never quite inhabits the
ideal s/he is compelled to approximate." JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER
231 (1993) [hereinafter BUTLER, BODlES].
2 By gender, I mean a systematic social construction of masculinity and femininity
that is little, if at all, constrained by biology. See generally, Sandra Harding, Introduction: Is There a Feminist Methodology?, in FEMINISM AND METHODOLOGY 1
(Sandra Harding ed., 1987). The social constructs cf masculine and feminine are
"metaphors we live by." GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE
LIVE By (1980). Use of the plural terms "masculinities" and "femininities" emphasizes the "diverse and differentially empowered" versions of masculinities or femininities and deliberately complicates the idea of a single, uniform masculinity or
femininity understood predominantly in relation to each other. RICHARD COLLIER,
MASCULINITIES, CRIME AND CRIMINOLOGY 4 (1998).
3 On the inseparability of race and gender, see Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Beyond Racism and Misogyny: Black Feminism and 2 Live Crew, in WORDS THAT
WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMEND.
MENT 111, 113-20 (Mari J. Matsuda et al. eds., 1993); Adrien Katherine Wing, Brief
Reflections Toward a Multiplicative Theory and Praxis of Being, in CRITICAL RACE
FEMINISM: A READER 27 (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997); Paulette M. Caldwell,
A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J.
365,374.
[183]
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gether for example, they shape what is expected of a poor young
White man or a middle-class, African American grandmother.
Racialized and class-based, gender helps to tell us who is frightening, who is powerful, and who is human.
Many observers understand the death penalty in the United
States as a story of racial injustice. 4 Capital punishment is also a
gender struggle. 5 The lopsided demographics-men commit
most crimes 6 -suggest that all crime and punishment is deeply
gendered. The fact that death row is even more overwhelmingly
4 See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L USA, KILLING WITH PREJUDICE: RACE AND THE
DEATH PENALTY (1999); DAVID
BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE
DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990); JESSE JACKSON, SR.,
ET AL., LEGAL LYNCHING: THE DEATH PENALTY AND AMERICA's FUTURE (2001);
David C. Baldus et a!., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials:
A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CaNsT. L. 3 (2001) [hereinafter Baldus,
Peremptory Challenges]; David C. Baldus et a!., Racial Discrimination and the Death

c.

Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, With Recent
Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638 (1998); John H. Blume et a!.,
Post-McCleskey Racial Discrimination Claims in Capital Cases, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
1771 (1998); Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of
Racial Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
433 (1995); Erwin Chemerinsky, Eliminating Discrimination in Administering the
Death Penalty: The Need for the Racial Justice Act, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 519
(1995); Ruth E. Friedman, Statistics and Death: The Conspicuous Role of Race Bias
in the Administration of the Death Penalty, 11 LA RAZA L.J. 75 (1999); Cynthia K.Y.
Lee, Race and the Victim: An Examination of Capital Sentencing and Guilt Attribution Studies, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 533 (1998); Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Probing the Capital Prosecutor's Perspective: Race of the Discretionary Actors, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
1811 (1998).
5 See, e.g., Joan W. Howarth, Deciding to Kill: Revealing the Gender in the Task
Handed to Capital Jurors, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1345 [hereinafter Howarth, Deciding to
Kill].

The power of the law is manifest in [the decision of a jury to punish someone by death]. If gendered structures in fact operate within apparently
neutral legal principles and procedures, they will be deeply at work in the
legal procedures that give the ultimate task-deciding life or death-to a
person, a juror.
[d. at 1350; see also Victor L. Streib, Gendering the Death Penalty: Countering Sex
Bias in a Masculine Sanctuary, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 433 (2002) [hereinafter Streib,

Gendering ].
6 "One of the more striking features of crime-both violent and nonviolent-is its
maleness." Ngaire Naffine, Book Review, 26 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC'Y
572 (2001); see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 211 (1993) (explaining that women have historically been "shut out of
key roles in criminal justice" and that "women criminals were always in short supply"). Ninety-two percent of federal inmates are men; ninety-five percent of state
inmates are men. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Offenders Statistics, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/crimoff.htm(lastvisitedApr.11.
2002).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2184871
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male7 than other parts of prison points to capital punishment as a
specific construction site of gender. Our system of capital punishment, with its elaborate procedures and ritualized executions,
enacts deep and powerful aspirations to masculinity. Kenneth
Karst reminds us: "The pursuit of manhood, above all, consists
in expressions of power, .on repeated occasions."8 Capital punishment consists of repeated expressions of lethal power authorized by law. 9 Gender helps to explain why we execute, and it
helps to determine who we execute.
As with other parts of the criminal justice system, the masculinities produced and reproduced by the death penalty are deeply
racialized. lO Although men of color disproportionately populate
death row,ll most death judgments are imposed to punish male
killers of White victimsP A Black man cQndemned to die, dangerous and without remorse, is one representation of masculinity
produced and reproduced by American capital punishment; a
Black man, subdued and humiliated, strapped onto the execu7 Approximately 98.5% of the people on death row in this country are men.
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., Death Row U.S.A.: Spring 2002,
at 3, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orglDEATHROWUSArecent.pdf (last visited
Apr. 6, 2002) [hereinafter Death Row U.S.A.].
B Kenneth L. Karst, "The Way Women Are": Some Notes in the Margin for Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 619, 622 (1998) [hereinafter Karst, Women].
9 As the person on death row is objectified/destroyed, the legal process that
carries out the execution is objectified/glorified. The death penalty ritual is
a symbolic power surge that reflects and builds the power of law. Each
execution sends an arrogant message, boasting that the legal system is capable of using its own rules to convert killing a person into something lawful. The legal process and its participants absorb and assume the power
rendered by the execution.
Joan W. Howarth, Review Essay: Feminism, Lawyering, and Death Row, 2 S. CAL.
REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 401, 418 (1992) [hereinafter Howarth, Feminism].
to Gender is not something that we inhabit or embody so much as something
we negotiate on an ongoing basis within the context of power relations ....
[Radically destabilizing conflicts of gender systems make] gender available
to all sides in any context, which, in turn, means that the variability of gender presents both dangers and powerful possibilities to the strategies of the
condemned and of the state.
Barbara Cruikshank, Feminism and Punishment, 24 StGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE &
SOC'Y 1113, 1115 (1999); see, e.g., JAMES W. MESSERSCHMIDT, MASCULINITIES AND
CRIME: CRITIQUE AND RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF THEORY (1993); RACE AND THE
SUBJECT OF MASCULINITIES (Harry Stecopoulos & Michael Uebel eds., 1997); Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 777,
779 (2000).
11 Death Row U.S.A., supra note 7, at 3. Death row consists of 1678 Whites, 1593
African Americans, 347 Latina/os, 41 Asians, and 41 Native Americans. Id.
12 Eighty-one percent of the victims of defendants executed since 1976 have been
White. Id. at 8.
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tioner's gurney, is another. 13 These different pictures of condemned men enact two versions of Black masculinities, which, in
turn, produce different versions of the racialized masculinity of
the executioner or even in the execution itself.14 This system of
capital punishment can be usefully understood as a performance
of White masculinities.
The gender of capital punishment, specifically the White masculinities of the death penalty, help to sustain it. The death penalty consists mainly of gender violence of men against menY In
short, the masculinities of the death penalty are performedproven-in relation to the masculinities of the condemned.
Thus, femininity of the condemned disrupts the system's effectiveness, at least symbolically. In some sense, then, executions of
feminine subjects are gender mistakes, placing the masculine authority of the state at risk. 16 The 1998 execution by Texas of ultra-feminine Karla Faye Tucker was such a gender and racial
mistake. Although guilty of a gruesome double murder by pickaxe, by the time of her execution Karla Faye Tucker had been
seen by many Americans to be an attractive, pious, charming,
and sweet young White woman, the embodiment of White femininity. Karla Faye Tucker's execution was troubling because capital punishment should protect White innocence, not kill it.
Identifying capital punishment as a cultural and political per13 See, e.g., Joan W. Howarth, Representing Black Male Innocence, 1 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 97, 102-08 (1997) [hereinafter Howarth, Black Male Innocence] (discussing socially constructed identity of African American men as dangerous
criminals). Currently forty-three percent of the men on death row are African
American. Death Row U.S.A., supra note 7, at 3.
14 See infra text accompanying notes 57-81 (describing capital punishment as a
gender performance); cf Robert A. Burt, Democracy, Equality, and the Death Penalty, in THE RULE OF LAW 80, 93 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994) [hereinafter Burt, Democracy] (suggesting that support for the death penalty reflects White fear of Black
retaliations for subjugation).
15 Cf Harris, supra note 10, at 779 ("since most victims of violent crime are male,
it may be that more men than women suffer from gender violence.").
16 Timothy Kaufman-Osborn has argued that, given the state's need to "obscure
the brutality of official killing," the execution of a woman, like a botched execution,
"may impair the state's quest to secure unequivocal control over the semiotic import
of its violence." Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn, Reviving the Late Liberal State: On
Capital Punishment in an Age of Gender Confusion, 24 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE
& SOC'y 1119, 1124 (1999) [hereinafter Kaufman-Osborn, Reviving]. The controversial execution of convicted Communist spy Ethel Rosenberg in 1953 was, in fact,
botched, in that second and third cycles of electricity were required to kill her. ROBERT JAY LIFI"ON & GREG MITCHELL, WHO OWNS DEATH?: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,
THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE, AND THE END OF EXECUTIONS 51 (2000).
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formance or negotiation of White' masculinities is not declaring it
a problem of White men, or even of men in general or White
people in generalP Support for capital punishment is a political
position, one that men and women of all races have the capacity
to embrace or reject. Although fewer women than men and
fewer Blacks than Whites, support the death penalty,18 women of
all races and men of color are just as capable of voting for, prosecuting, affirming, and cheering for executions. 19 No natural position inclines men to violence and women to peacefulness,2o or
even men to masculinity and women to the feminine. Aspirations to masculinity are not reserved for men.
Understanding the gender in capital punishment requires acknowledging that qualities of masculine and feminine are not
necessarily aligned with biological males and females. 21 Justice
William Rehnquist pr~vides authority for this point. When he
17 I am suggesting that, in the United States, the cultural practice of Whiteness
(see IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE By LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCI'ION OF RACE
(1996» and of capital punishment reinforce each other. For a discussion of race as
culture, see Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color Blind," 44 STAN.
L. REV. 1,4-5,56-58 (1991). For a demonstration that some meanings of Whiteness
are not necessarily limited to Whites, see, e.g., Suzanne A. Kim, Comment, "Yellow"
Skin, "White" Masks: Asian American "Impersonations" of Whiteness and the Feminist Critique of Liberal Equality, 8 ASIAN L.J. 89 (2001); see also Janine Young Kim,
Note, Are Asians Black? The Asian-American Civil Rights Agenda and the Contemporary Significance of the BlacklWhite Paradigm, 108 YALE L.J. 2385 (1999).
18 See, e.g., LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 16, at 217-18; Phoebe C. Ellsworth &
Samuel R. Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes: Americans' Views on the Death Penalty, J. Soc. ISSUES, Summer 1994, at 24 [hereinafter Ellsworth & Gross, Hardening
of the Attitudes]; see also infra text accompanying notes 88-92 (discussing distortion
of isolating gender from race or class in this comparison between men and women).
19 See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, Women in Black, N. YORKER, Oct. 30, 2000, at 48, 54
(describing fierce death penalty records of two women judges in Texas).
20 See Howarth, Feminism, supra note 9, at 411.
My argument is not that feminists should oppose executions because violence is male, or because women's nature is nonviolent. Such claims obscure the more complicated and perhaps distressing reality .... Feminists
should work against the death penalty not because women are nonviolent,
but because the opposite is true. Opposition to executions is a political
choice of women and men, all of whom have the capacity for violence and
destruction.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
21 Judith Butler has written:
When the constructed status of gender is theorized as radically independent of sex, gender itself becomes a free-floating artifice, with the consequence that man and masculine might just as easily signify a female body
as a male one, and woman and feminine a male body as easily as a female
one.
JUDrrH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDEN·
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was a law clerk, Rehnquist complained in a memo to Justice
Clark that the "highest court of the nation" was handling death
penalty cases "like a bunch of old women."22 Young Rehnquist's
complaint is useful not simply to illustrate the subordinated relationship between the perceived weak, feminine approach versus
the strong, masculine approach;23 it also highlights the perfectly
coherent sting in describing the all-male court with the sneering
charge of acting like old women. Gender is fundamental yet insecure, always ready for renegotiation, never stable, never something on which to rely. Thus, gender is more fluid and dangerous
than Kenneth Karst suggests when he writes of the women students at the Virginia Military Institute, "not a single one of them
needed to prove that she is a real man. ,,24 Perhaps some of them
do. 2s
TITY, 6 (1990) [hereinafter BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE]. See generally JUDITH
HALBERSTAM, FEMALE MASCULINITY (1998).
22 DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT 34 (1992). We may find some irony in the fact that the two sitting
justices of the Supreme Court who have expressed reservations about our death
penalty system are the two old women. See, e.g., Henry Weinstein, Death Penalty
Study Suggests Errors, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2002, at Al3 ("[E]ven two Supreme
Court justices-Sandra Day O'Connor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg-[have] recently
expressed doubts about whether the process is working fairly."); Charles Lane &
Michael A. Fletcher, High Court Takes Up Two Big Issues: School Vouchers and
Death Penalty Spark Lively Debate, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2002, at A6 ("Two justices, [Sandra Day] O'Connor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, have publicly voiced their
concerns about the quality of legal advice given to capital defendants."). Noting that
Minnesota does not have the death penalty, Justice O'Connor told the Minnesota
Women Lawyers' Association, "You must breathe a big sigh of relief every day."
O'Connor Questions Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, July 4,2001, at A9.
23 We know that Rehnquist did not choose the metaphor of old women to
suggest that the Court's handling of capital cases was marked by wisdom,
endurance, and strength. More likely he meant that the Court was too nervous about executions, perhaps too fussy, and certainly too weak. Rehnquist wanted the capital doctrine produced by the most authoritative court
to be clear, forceful, and more-well, manly.
Howarth, Deciding to Kill, supra note 5, at 1354.
24 Karst, Women, supra note 8, at 625. Some women aviators in the Navy, for
example, have embraced the masculine culture.
Many women who made a career as Navy aviators, though they were not
allowed in combat, had become part of the swaggering subculture-a
group whose death-defying daily routines set them apart within the Navy.
They talked tough and weren't prissy about sex, and one would occasionally show her spirit by grabbing a male colleague's crotch and Shouting,
"Package check!"
Peter J. Boyer, Admiral Boorda's War, N. YORKER, Sept. 16, 1996, at 68, 71-72.
25 See generally Taylor Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include
Transgender Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 392 (2001) (promoting focus on transgender rights to challenge

Executing White Masculinities

189

Neither static nor universal, the gender in any system of capital
punishment is shaped by its particular culture and history. The
Cherokee laws that entrusted women to decide whether captives
should be killed or brought into the tribe reflected and created
powerful meanings of masculinity and femininity specific to their
times and places;26 so do the current Russian (and former Soviet)
formal prohibitions against executing women. 27 India's explicit
recognition that a woman's sex is a factor indicating that she
should not be executed, whatever her crime,28 constructs masculinities and femininities in ways different from Russia and from
the United States. Given the racial history and context of the
death penalty in the United States, the masculinities of our executions are deeply racialized. Through his association with
Texas' death penalty, George W. Bush, having racked up 152 executions29 like notches on a revolver, negotiated a particularly
potent version of White American masculine identity.
Given the masculinist symbolic and material heft of capital
punishment, why is the gender in capital punishment almost30 inmisguided association of gender with biology); Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male
and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L.
REV. 265 (1999); Julie A. Greenberg, When Is a Man a Man, and When is a Woman a
Woman?, 52 FLA. L. REV. 745, 746 n.7 (2000) (citing estimates that between .1 %
and 4% of the population are intersexual, defined as people whose biological sex
attributes are not all congruent) ..
26 Rennard Strickland, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO
COURT 26 (1975). Similarly, women were a force protecting accused murderers
from the clan revenge system for dealing with homicide. Id.
27 See Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Female Offenders, 58 U. CiN. L. REV.
845, 880 (1990) [hereinafter Streib, Female Offenders].
28 See Streib, Gendering, supra note 5, at 433.
29 The State of Texas Department of Corrections maintains a list of Texas executions. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, Death Row Information, Executed Offenders, at http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/staUexecutedoffenders.htm (last updated June 26,
2002).
30 The legal scholars who work this field are Professors Phyllis Crocker, Elizabeth
Rapaport, Victor Streib, and myself. See, e.g., Phyllis L. Crocker, Childhood Abuse
and Adult Murder: Implications for the Death Penalty, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1143 (1999);
Phyllis L. Crocker, Feminism and Defending Men on Death Row, 29 ST. MARY's L.J.
981 (1998); Phyllis L. Crocker, Is the Death Penalty Good for Women?, 4 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 917 (2001); Howarth, Deciding to Kill, supra note 5; Howarth, Feminism, supra note 9; Elizabeth Rapaport, Capital Murder and the Domestic Discount:
A Study of Capital Domestic Murder in the Post-Furman Era, 49 SMU L. REV. 1507
(1996) [hereinafter, Rapaport, Domestic Discount]; Elizabeth Rapaport, Staying
Alive: Executive Clemency, Equal Protection, and the Politics of Gender in Women's
Capital Cases, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 967 (2001) [hereinafter Rapaport, Staying
Alive]; Elizabeth Rapaport, Equality of the Damned: The Execution of Women on
the Cusp of the 21st Century, 26 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 581 (2000) [hereinafter
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visible? Perhaps the maleness of death row31 is such old news 32
that it is hardly worth noticing. Perhaps, like the air we breathe,
it is considered natural and thus unnoticed, except in occasional
weather outbursts, like tornadoes. Karla Faye Tucker's execution caused such a tornado,. but the gender of capital punishment
quickly receded from public awareness with six obscure executions of women after Karla Faye Tucker.
Although the gender of capital punishment is forgotten, it has
not become less important. Condemning females does not disrupt the masculinities· of capital punishment, but condemning
femininity does. This Article addresses, in turn, the gender in
punishing by death, the gender of those chosen for death, and the
gender-bending execution of Karla Faye Tucker. By understanding what Justice Blackmun called the "machinery of death"33 as
repeated performances34 of White masculinities, we might loosen
Rapaport, Damned]; Elizabeth Rapaport, Some Questions About Gender and the
Death Penalty, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 501 (1990); Elizabeth Rapaport, The
Death Penalty and Gender Discrimination, 25 LAW & SOC'y REV. 367 (1991) [hereinafter Rapaport, Gender Discrimination]; Victor L. Streib, America's Adversion to
Executing Women, 1 OHIO N.U. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1997); Victor L. Streib, Death
Penalty for Battered Women, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 163 (1992); Victor L. Streib,
Death Penalty for Lesbians, 1 NAT'L. J. SEXUAL ORIENTATION L. 104 (1995); Streib,
Female Offenders, supra note 27; Streib, Gendering, supra note 5; see also Cruikshank, supra note 10; Renee Heberle, Disciplining Gender; or, are Women Getting
away with Murder?, 24 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC'y 1103 (1999); Timothy
V. Kaufman-Osborn, Gender and the Death Penalty: Introduction, 24 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC'y 1097 (1999) [hereinafter Kaufman-Osborn, Introduction];
Kaufman-Osborn, Reviving, supra note 16.
31 As of January 1, 2002, there were 3657 men and fifty-four women on death rows
in the United States. Death Row U.S.A., supra note 7, at 3. The percentage of
women on death row has been consistently around two percent for several years.
Streib, Gendering, supra note 5, at 439,
32 Justice Thurgood Marshall noted "overwhelming evidence that the death penalty is employed against men and not women" thirty years ago. Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 365 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
33 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from den. of
cert.).
34 See, e.g., BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 21, at 136-39 (describing gender as a performance). "The practice by which gendering occurs, the embodying of
norms, is a compulsory practice, a forcible production .... " BUTLER, BODIES, supra
note 1, at 231.
In this sense, gender is not a noun, but neither is it a set of free-floating
attributes . . . . Hence, ... gender proves to be performative-that is,
constituting the identity it is purported to be. In this sense, gender is always a doing, though not a doing by a subject who might be said to preexist
the deed.
BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 21, at 24-25.
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our attraction to capital punishment35 and to hierarchies of
racialized gender. 36
I
EXECUTIONS PRODUCING MASCULINITIES

A.

The Symbolic Power of Crime

Jonathan Simon urges us "to understand why crime is such a
compelling story about ourselves."37 The masculinities of crime
and punishment are a large part of the answer. All crime and
punishment issues carry great cultural meaning. 38 In part, we understand ourselves and our society based on how we understand
crime and punishment. 39 As David Garland has written, the
criminal justice system "communicates meaning not just about
crime and punishment but also about power, authority, legitimacy, normality, morality, personhood, social relations and a
host of other tangential matters. "40
35 See also Streib, Gendering, supra note 5, at 437-38 (calling the death penalty a
"masculine sanctuary" and arguing that "[t]his perspective reveals more clearly than
any other the true motivating forces behind the general death penalty debate.").
36 "A serious feminist project for the theory of law is not simply to embrace the
'female' side of these dualisms, the task undertaken by relational feminists, but further to strip away the false male cover to reveal the messier reality~that is, to reject
the basic dichotomies." Howarth, Deciding to Kill, supra note 5, at 1350 (citing to
ZILLAH EISENSTEIN, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE LAW 4-5 (1988) and Mari Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method,
11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7 (1989».
37 Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime, in THE CRIME CONUNDRUM: EsSAYS ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 171, 175 (Lawrence M. Friedman & George Fisher eds.,
1997).
38 For a discussion of the cultural meanings of criminal justice, see David Garland,
Punishment and Culture: The Symbolic Dimension of Criminal Justice, 11 STUD. L.
POLITICS & SOC'y 191 (1991).
More than most legal phenomena, the practices of prohibiting and punishing are directed outwards, towards the public-towards "society"-and
claim to embody the sentiments and the moral vision not of lawyers, but of
"the people." And whether or not this claim can be sustained, it makes
penality a particularly apposite site of a culturalist approach ....
Id. at 192.
39 [d. at 192-93 ("the law's last-resort power to punish ... relies on meaning and
symbols and representations that construe its own actions and weave them into the
belief-systems, sensibilities, and cultural narratives of the social actors and audiences
involved."). "Punishment is a dramatic, performative representation of the way
things officially are and ought to be, whatever else the deviant would make of
them." [d. at 208. "In the acts and institutions of punishment, the state-or ruling
elite of whatever kind-self-consciously constructs its own public image and, in part,
its .own reality." Id.
40 [d. at 195. Garland continues,
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Only recently have we noticed that crime and punishment are
largely stories about men trying to be men.41 Masculinities are
formed by race and class, in part by competition between men as
well as through separation from women and from "feminine"
men, or homosexuals. 42 These formations are urgent and unsettled, and often policed and defended through violence. 43 LawPenal signs and symbols are one part of a complex array of institutional
discourses that seek to organize our moral and political understanding and
to educate our sentiments and sensibilities. They provide a continuous, repetitive set of instructions as to how we should think about good and evil,
normal and pathological, legitimize and iIIegitimize, order and disorder.
Through their judgments, condemnations, and classifications they teach us
how to judge, what to condemn, and how to classify, and they supply a set
of languages, idioms, and vocabularies with which to do so. These signifying practices also tell us where to locate social authority, how to preserve
order and community, where to look for social dangers and how to feel
about these matters ....
[d. at 195.
41 For considerations of gender in crime, see Mary Ellen Gale, Calling in the Girl
Scouts: Feminist Legal Theory and Police Misconduct, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 691
(2001); CRIMINOLOGY AT THE CROSSROADS: FEMINIST READINGS IN CRIME AND
JUSTICE (Kathleen Daly & Lisa Maher eds., 1998) [hereinafter CRIMINOLOGY AT
THE CROSSROADS]; Kathleen Daly & Michael Tonry, Gender, Race, and Sentencing,
22 CRIME & JUST. 201 (1997); JANIS ApPIER, POLICING WOMEN: THE SEXUAL
POLITICS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE LAPD (1998); NGAIRE NAFFINE, FE·
MALE CRIME: THE CONSTRUCTION OF WOMEN IN CRIMINOLOGY (1987); Dana M.
Britton, Feminism in Criminology: Engendering the Outlaw, 571 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOc. SCI. 57, 58 (2000). "Criminology remains one of the most thoroughly masculinized of all social science fields; certainly, it is one of the last academic bastions in which scholars regularly restrict their studies to the activities and
habits of men without feeling compelled to account for this." [d. (citation omitted).
For discussions of masculinities in crime, see MESSERSCHMIDT, supra note 10; JUST
Boys DOING BUSINESS? MEN, MASCULINITIES, AND CRIME (Tim Newburn & Elizabeth A. Stanko eds., 1994); Kenneth Polk, Masculinity, Honour, and Confrontational
Homicide, in CRIMINOLOGY AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 41, at 188.
42 See, e.g. , MESSERSCHMIDT, supra note 10; RACE AND THE SUBJECT OF MASCULINITIES, supra note 10.
43 Law enforcement, like military combat, is culturally gendered male partly
to preserve for men a monopoly of legitimize violence-a myth they cannot relinquish without also surrendering what many men seem to believe,
consciously or not, to be an indispensable core of their masculine identity,
the capacity for domination of others and the regular performance of that
domination to ensure their place in the male hierarchy.
Gale, supra note 41, at 728 (footnote omitted).
Men disempowered by racial or class status develop alternative rebellious
ways of proving their manhood; at the same time, "dominant" men may
envy "subordinate" men, and rebellious men may long to be accepted into
the mainstream. In addition to these complex relationships with one another, all men experience the pressures not to be women and not to be
"faggots." The instability of masculine identity in the face of all these pressure makes violence in defense of self-identity a constant possibility.
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breaking, victimhood, and our responses to them perform
gender, creating men and women. Capital punishment is an important chapter in this story.

B.

The Symbolic Power of Capital Punishment

David Garland draws on sociology and anthropology to suggest that punishment is so symbolically powerful because it is "an
arena of social tension and social conflict"44 and because "the
intractable problems of social and hum~n existence provide a
rich soil for the development of myths, rites and symbols, as cultures strive to control and make sense of these difficult areas of
experience. "45 Killing is the most extreme form of social conflict;
not surprisingly, the death penalty, a terrible murder followed by
a state killing, harnesses and creates very strong symbolic meanings. Death penalty cases are exceptional, dramatic, and compelling. We, as a culture, notice them; indeed, as the most visible
official response to crime, they are intended to be noticed. The
execution has lethal physical consequences on the body of the
condemned, but the ritualized killing of human life is fundamentally a performance directed to and undertaken for the public. 46
The death penalty is a kind of popular moral entertainment,47
an exercise of power so flamboyant 48 that ordinary people perceive themselves to have participated in it. Supporting the death
penalty is taking action and ending frustration 49 about crime and
Harris, supra note 10, at 780.
44 Garland, supra note 38, at 216.
45 Id. at 216. "The practical business of punishing offenders thus takes place
within a cultural space that is already laden with meaning and that lends itself easily
to symbolic use." Id.
46 See, e.g., id. at 197 ("[R]ituals and symbolic practices [of punishment] continue
to operate as a kind of strategic counterpoint to policies of regulation-their chief
target being the law-abiding population and those who straddle the boundaries between deviance and the norm.").
47 Cf Simon, supra note 37, at 184 ("[I]nstead of backing away from our commitment to governing through crime, we openly offer punishment for the purposes of
warehousing the untrustworthy and creating moral entertainments (like chain gangs)
for the virtuous. Whatever the merits of these purposes, neither augurs well for
democratic practice.").
48 Cf Burt, Democracy, supra note 14, at 93 (referring to the flamboyance of
capital punishment).
49 See Ellsworth & Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes, supra note 18, at 42 ("If
there is anyone emotion that mediates between crime and support of the death
penalty, it is probably frustration rather than fear. "). Ellsworth and Gross suggest
that research about death penalty attitudes should focus on emotions, especially
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general social breakdown. 50 Crudely put, capital punishment
functions less as crime control policy and more like the closest
thing we have to an official snuff film. "Executed bodies perform
their political mission well when their utter impotence, their absolute lack of vitality, testifies to the robust agency. of the
state .... "51 The cultural and public visibility of the death penalty-as a symbol of power, of taking control, of doing justicemakes it important as a potential site of knowledge about ourselves and our society, and about gender.
Social scientists confirm that attitudes toward the death penalty are highly symbolic. 52 Some evidence suggests that "death
penalty attitudes are a matter of self-identification."53 Indeed,
perhaps "death penalty attitudes are not based on rational considerations at all, but are fundamentally noninstrumental symbolic attitudes, based on emotions and ideological self-image."54
The deep symbolic power of crime and punishment is clearly
linked to its extreme politicalization; a politician is able to take a
stand without fear of being found wrong. "Criminal justice issues ... are abstractions for most of the electorate. Even those
who are victimized by crime have no way of appreciating the consequences of different policies on incarceration."55 Capital punishment is not really about making anyone safer; it is a symbolic
representation of taking revenge against crime. 56
frustration and anger. [d. at 45. They also posit that frustration and anger, not fear
are the driving emotions. [d.
Anger is the most positive of the negative emotions, because it is the only
one that confers a sense of power. When politicians argue, angrily, for the
death penalty, they may communicate that they are in control, and at the
same time arouse a satisfying sense of outrage and power in the voter.
[d.

50 See, e.g. , Simon, supra note 37, at 176. Simon argues that voters in the United
States and elsewhere have "affirmed the belief that social control is breaking down
and that punishment of crime is the most promising strategy for checking that breakdown." [d. (footnote omitted).
51 Kaufman-Osborn, Reviving, supra note 16, at 1121.
52 See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, The Romance of Revenge: Capital Punishment in
America, 13 STUD. L. POLITICS, & SOC'y 71, 88 (1993) [hereinafter Gross, Romance]
(referencing Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Lee Ross, Public Opinion and Capital Punishment: A Close Examination of the Views of Abolitionists and Retentionists, 29 CRIME
& DELINQ. 116, 161-65 (1983)); see also Burt, Democracy, supra note 14, at 93 (suggesting that support for the death penalty reflects White fear of Black retaliations
for subjugation).
53 Ellsworth & Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes, supra note 18, at 24.
54 [d. at 31 (citations omitted).
55 Gross, Romance, supra note 52, at 88.
56 "People want the death penalty for revenge." Gross, Romance, supra note 52,
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Virtually all powerful symbols of authority, morality, and justice are laden with gender. The symbolic power of capital punishment is the power of violence, both of the underlying crime
and of the punishment. 57 In a society in which our culture and
our identities are bound by deep pressures and anxieties of gender-masculine over feminine, masculine over masculine-the
capacity and willingness to do violence is traditionally understood to be crucial for men; or, as we might now say, crucial for
performing masculinities. "[V]iolent acts committed by men,
whether these acts break the law or are designed to uphold it, are
often a way of demonstrating the perpetrator's manhood."58
Masculine identity is linked to violence, both of the criminal and
of the state. 59
The death penalty makes a statement about the power of violence and the meaning of death. It is an expression of public
policy and political will that attempts to make sense of violence
by recreating it. State killing sets apart the condemned, choosing
them to be dramatically expelled from the community, from civilization, from the world of the living.60 Capital punishment represents the ultimate power of the state over its citizens; at the
at 79. Is the desire for revenge a masculine emotion? Samuel Gross uses as a prototype of personal vengeance "the grieving father tracking down and killing the killer
of his child." Id. Perhaps our death penalty system is not only a substitute for the
personal revenge of the father, but also an elaborate system to invite the mother to
have a means of revenge. "The process by which we carry out this judgment has
little in common with the conduct of an avenger. It is slow, passionless, impersonal-unreliable, and rare." [d. at 80.
57 See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, Update: American Public Opinion on the Death
Penalty-It's Getting Personal, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1448, 1471 (1998) [hereinafter
Gross, Update] (citing Ellsworth & Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes, supra note 18,
at 32-33 ("Death penalty attitudes are about killing.
58 Harris, supra note 10, at 780 (calling this violence "gender violence").
59 See, e.g., John Braithwaite & Kathleen Daly, Masculinities, Violence and Communitarian Control, in CRIME CONTROL AND WOMEN: FEMINIST IMPLICATIONS OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY 151 (Susan L. Miller ed., 1998) [hereinafter CRIME CONTROL AND WOMEN].
Violence is gendered: it is a problem and consequence of masculinity.
Contemporary state interventions to control violence are no less gendered:
structures of response, from arrest through imprisonment, glorify tough
cops, celebrate adversarial relations, and construct a virtuous 'protective'
state by incarcerating or, in some countries, killing the "bad guys."
Id. at 151. In some ways, the complex idea of moral violence itself represents dueling masculinities.
60 See Austin Sarat, Capital Punishment as a Legal, Political, and Cultural Fact:
An Introduction, in THE KILLING STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS,
AND CULTURE 3, 9-10 (Austin Sarat ed., 1999) [hereinafter THE KILLING STATE].
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same time, it. reinforces the powerlessness of the state to stop
violence. Executions produce deep and complex messages about
the might and authority of the state. 61
By dramatizing the violence of the state against the condemned, the death penalty creates a solidarity of people with the
state, even among populations normally quite oppositional and
resentful toward the government. Popular resentment is somehow harnessed by the state in its war against criminals. 62 In some
ways, this functions like patriotism, or identification with the
state in its violent efforts against a common enemy in war. 63
Phoebe Ellsworth and Samuel Gross have told us:
It is not hard to understand why many people support capital

punishment even though they believe it does not deter crime
and is not fair. The death penalty is concrete, it is forceful,
David Garland describes the meaning of a public execution:
The public execution takes the form of a theatrical spectacle in which the
sheer force of the sovereign's power is publicly displayed on the body of
the condemned. At the same time, the vital connection between the sovereign and God is reinforced, not just by the display of the sovereign's power
over life and death, but also by the religious language and symbolism (of
the publicly announced sentence, the offender's ritualized confession and
the cleric's prayers and benediction) that tie the law of the sovereign to the
will of God and the natural order of things. In this form of punishment,
authority is construed as absolute, divinely inspired and socially ascendent.
Garland, supra note 38, at 208·09. Then Texas Governor George W. Bush explicitly
invoked religious authority while justifying his own refusal to intervene in his statement upon Karla Faye Tucker's execution: "Judgments about the heart and soul of
an individual on death row are best made by a higher authority." Jesse Katz, Texas
Executes Born-Again Woman After Appeal Fails, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1998, at AI.
The constitutionally-mandated discretion as to whether any particular defendant
should be executed (see infra text accompanying notes 160-63) co-exists uneasily
with this ascendent, absolute authority. Garland suggests that, under a social contract theory of punishment, punishment must be "dispensed in a controlled and lawful manner. The power that they symbolize, though still awesome in its way, is
circumspect, clearly defined and precisely limited. It has the authority of duly enacted law." Garland, supra note 38, at 209. This is masculine at war with discretion.
Certainty is at war with discretion. Force is at war with individuality. [d. at 208-09.
62 See generally William E. Connolly, The Will, Capital Punishment, and Cultural
War, in THE KILLING STATE, supra note 60, at 187 (describing politics of capital
punishment within a culture of resentment).
63 The current "War on Terrorism" might provoke a return to popular embrace of
state legitimacy and purpose that permits a decline in the need to use symbolic gestures such as the death penalty to respond to an otherwise "chronic 'legitimacy deficit.'" Cf Kaufman-Osborn, Reviving, supra note 16, at 1120 (drawing upon
JURGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1975». The
masculine imagery and rhetoric of the War on Terrorism has been pervasive, suggesting that it might be functioning as a response to a perhaps chronic "masculinity
deficit" as well.
61
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and it is final (which nothing else seems to be); it is something,
and being for it means that you insist that something be
done. 64
"

In this way, the death penalty promises masculine satisfaction.
Borrowing William Rehnquist's words, approving the death penalty means that you are not responding to lawlessness "like a
bunch of old women. "65
Supporting the death penalty means that "you insist that something be done," but, of course, the something that is being done
is the killing of poor people,66 mainly men, most of whom have
been convicted of killing White people. 67 Capital punishment as
it is enacted tells a twisted story about crime, gender, race, and
class. For example, it tells us that the most important victims of
crime are White. 68 It tells us that the worst criminals are poor.
In these and many other ways, the manliness of executions and
powerful masculinities of the death penalty, like other executions
of gender, are performed through race and class. 69
C.

The Manliness of Executions

Manliness is constituted in part by physical strength, superiority, and domination. Historically, executions displayed those
traits: "[T]here must be an emphatic affirmation of power and its
intrinsic superiority. And this superiority is not simply that of
right, but that of the physical strength of the sovereign beating
down upon the body of his adversary and mastering it .... "70
"Manliness is one of those ideas that is often made real with
violence. "71
64 Ellsworth & Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes, supra note 18, at 42; cf Howarth, Deciding to Kill, supra note 5, at 1354.
65 Howarth, Deciding to Kill, supra note 5, at 1353-54.
66 See, e.g., Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories
and the Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 563 (1995) (describing
profound poverty in histories of most capital defendants).
67 Eighty-one percent of the victims of defendants executed since 1976 have been
white. Death Row U.S.A., supra note 7, at 8.
681d.
69 Cf Karen D. Pyke, Class-Based Masculinities: The Interdependence of Gender,
Class, and Interpersonal Power, 10 GENDER & SOC'y 527 (1996).
70 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 49
(Alan Sheridan trans., 1979).
71 Harris, supra note 10, at 781, drawing on the work of literary theorist Elaine
Scarry in THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE WORLD 13-14
(1985); see also Kaufman-Osborn, Reviving, supra note 16, at 1121 (assessing the
death penalty in light of Scarry's work). "Although Scarry draws her examples from
the domains of war and torture, a perhaps still more obvious instance of what she
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Today the violence of an execution is routinely hidden and
minimized.72 The Florida Senate Majority Leader who witnessed
Judy Buenoano's electrocution pronounced it "antiseptic," like
"a grim ballet .... When they pulled the switch it was over.'>73
The civilizing move to lethal injection partially obscures the violence of the execution. 74 "Death is the culmination of a long series of procedures, performed by technicians under the
surveillance of diverse, carefully trained administrators, recorded
in scrupulous detail."75 This new, sanitized version of executions
offers the same kind of partial invitation to women to become
executioners as computerized warfare welcomes women into battle, that is, from the masculine physicality of the past to the informal masculine technology domain of the present. 76
However sanitized and bureaucratized, executions continue to
be associated with White masculinity. This point is made, without subtlety, in the recent film Monster's Ball,77 in which the
work of capital punishment is linked to cruel, misogynist, White
supremacist, violent hyper-masculinity. Billy Bob Thornton
plays Hank, a prison guard and an executioner who is racist,
mean, woman-hating, and gun-loving. His notion of manhood is
domination and cruelty. The film shows his redemption, of which
his first step is quitting his job as the executioner at the prison. 78
Having rejected the hyper-masculine identity of executioner,
Hank ultimately remakes himself as a loving, generous man,
someone capable of caring for and embracing the Black victims
of the execution. Monster's Ball powerfully combines hypermasculinity of executions with racist identities. Hank's manhood
calls 'analogical verification' is human sacrifice." [d. "[T]he consummation of a
death sentence is one of the more striking means by which ... 'real human pain' is
'converted into a regime's fiction of power.'" [d. at 18 (quoting Scarry).
72 For a discussion of the role of law in hiding the violence of the death penalty,
see Howarth, Deciding to Kill, supra note 5, at 1390-91.
73 LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 16, at 59.
74 Cf Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
75 Anne Norton, After the Terror: Mortality, Equality, Fraternity, in THE KILLING
STATE, supra note 60, at 27.
76 Perhaps in some way the move to lethal injections is related to the dominant
ideology of supposed gender-neutrality in public life. See infra text accompanying
notes 104-71 (discussing application of formal gender equality to the death penalty).
77 MONSTER'S BALL (Lions Gate Films 2001).
78 His son, Sonny, manifests kindness, cross-racial friendships, and decency. He is
sneered at by his father and grandfather as being womanly. His kindness to a condemned prisoner and his physical revulsion at the execution are key signs of his
womanly weakness. /d.
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was once established by cruelty to women and to Black men; he
becomes human, however, by rejecting this racist hyper-masculine identity. In this, Monster's Ball follows William Rehnquist
and many others who understand the willingness to impose death
as a sign of masculinity.79
The deep symbolic association between the death penalty and
masculinities may influence specific aspects of the capital punishment debate in complex ways. Robert Weisberg, Samuel Gross,
and others have written about the profound ambivalence in the
United States toward executions, namely that this country wants
to have the death penalty, but we want it to exist without much
use. 80 Perhaps this ambivalence represents a cultural production
of masculinity related to combatting the modern distaste for executions. Similarly, perhaps we defend ourselves against international condemnation with a masculine national pride that
carelessly dismisses all those countries that have given up executions as simply weak ("like a bunch of old women"). Finally, and
more clearly, lack of willingness to conduct executions has
marked political candidates as too infirm to lead. Personal aversion to killing is damning for a politician, perhaps because it embodies feminine weakness. In the hyper-agitated world of
California politics, Dianne Feinstein beat John Van de Kamp in
the 1990 governor's primary because Dianne Feinstein was
"tougher" on the death penalty.81 On this issue, Feinstein wore
the mantle of masculinity more effectively than Van de Kamp.
D.

Women Performing the Death Penalty

If maintaining the machinery of death is a performance of mas-

culinity, given the deep associations between women and femininities we might expect that women's rates of participation in
79 For example, Lifton and Mitchell ask about the prosecutor of Harris County,
Texas, who has led Houston to become the death capital of the country, "Yet how
tough is Holmes, really? He never attends an execution .... [L]ike so many others
caught up in the killing process, he is all too willing to pass along responsibility.
'Everyone who got death in Harris County,' he said, 'has gotten it from a jury.'"
LIFroN & MITCHELL, supra note 16, at 110-11. "Holmes claims he is not 'bloodthirsty'; he's 'just a lawyer. I follow the law.'" [d. at 110.
80 See Gross, Romance, supra note 52; Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death,
1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305 (1983); cf Kaufman-Osborn, Reviving, supra note 16, at
1120 (predicting that the liberal state's dilemma related to executing women will be
resolved with more women sentenced to death but few executed).
81 Gross, Romance, supra note 52, at 92.
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and support for capital punishment would be different than
men's.
Historically, women's civic participation as promoters and
practitioners of death penalty policy has been mixed. Women
make up a sizeable portion of the American anti-death penalty
movement of today,82 and did so in the 1800S. 83 Other women
(and their children) were part of the crowds that gathered for
public executions. For many decades after the end of public killings, women were not permitted to witness executions. 84 Louis
Masur describes that the end of public executions in the midnineteenth century "turned the execution of criminals into an
elite event centered around class and gender exclusion rather
than communal instruction."85 More recently, in the era of formal gender equality, which has eliminated most explicitly sexbased exclusions,86 women have witnessed executions as officials,
surviving victims, and reporters. 87
Today, social scientists commonly report that more men than
women favor the death penalty.88 Isolating gender in this way
obscures differences in race and class. If capital punishment is a
performance of White masculinities, we would expect that the
rates of people of color's participation in and support for capital
punishment would be lower than Whites. Indeed, one study
found that almost all district attorneys in death penalty states, the
government lawyers with the discretion to seek death, are
82 For a description of the anti-death penalty movement, see HERBERT H.
HAINES, AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE ANTI-DEATH PENALTY MOVEMENT
IN AMERICA, 1972-1994 (1996). Perhaps the most prominent anti-death penalty activist is Sister Helen Prejean, author of DEAD MAN WALKING: AN EYEWITNESS
ACCOUNT OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1993).
83 LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 16, at 34.
841d. at 31.
85 LOUIS P. MASUR, RITES OF EXECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1776-1875, at 6 (1989).
86 See infra text accompanying notes 104-17 (discussing formal gender equality
especially as it relates to women being executed).
87 State Senator Ginny Brown-Waite witnessed a bloody execution in Florida in
1999 and interpreted the blood on the condemned man's shirt as a cross, a sign from
God that either the condemned had made his peace with God or that God "was
giving his blessing to Forida's execution policy." LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note
16, at 60.
88 E.g., Ellsworth & Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes, supra note 18, at 21; LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 16, at 217-18 (finding the gender gap less than might
be expected for an issue of "violence" and noting that the 2000 ABC poll found
male support for the death penalty at seventy-three percent, female at fifty-six
percent).
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White. 89 As to public opinion, Whites support the death penalty
much more than do African Americans or Latinos;90 White men
support the death penalty much more than do African American
men.91 Americans in high and middle-income levels are more
likely than lower-income people to support the death penalty.92
Women's attitudes about the death penalty reflect and sustain
gendered qualities of violence and punishment. For example,
culturally, women, rather than men, are more easily understood.
to be victims. 93 Interestingly, then, more women than men question the death penalty, even though, to the extent that women
see themselves as potential victims of crime,94 they may understand themselves to be the possible beneficiaries of the death
penalty.95 Apparent readiness to do violence may conflict with
89 Pokorak, supra note 4, at 1817 (97.5% of district attorneys in death penalty
states are White; 1.2% are African American; 1.2% are Latino).
90 See, e.g., Pamela Paul, Pulse: The Death Penalty, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Nov.
2001, at 22 ("In 2001, seventy-three percent of whites support the death penalty,
compared with sixty-three percent of Hispanics and only forty-six percent of
Blacks."). In January 2000 a survey for ABC News found a difference of thirty-one
percentage points between White and Black support for the death penalty; sixtynine percent of Whites but only thirty-eight percent of Blacks favored the death
penalty. LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 16, at 217. :
91 One 1994 poll that adjusted results for race and gender found levels of support
for the death penalty at 82.8% of White men, 74.9% of White women, 56.7% of
Black males, and 47.5% of Black women. Baldus, Peremptory Challenge, supra
note 4, at 20 n.40.
92 See, e.g., id. at 21 (higher income correlates with support for the death penalty); Ellsworth and Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes, supra note 18, at 21 (middle
class favors death penalty more than poor). Samuel Gross has suggested that our
continued support for the death penalty (instead of following the many nations
whose elites abolished capital punishment in spite of its popular support) may be
based on the relatively stronger democratization of our criminal justice system.
Gross, Romance, supra note 52, at 88. This supposition does not deal adequately
with the evidence that Americans of lower incomes are less likely than wealthier
ones to support the death penalty, and promotes a reassuring notion of effective
democracy that is not justified by voting patterns and the race and class patterns of
criminal justice in particular.
"
93 See, e.g., People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 25 (Cal. 1996) (claiming that its decision upholding use of "battered women's syndrome" would not "compel adoption of
a 'reasonable gang member' standard"); Lorraine Schmall, Forgiving Guin Garcia:
Women, the Death Penalty and Commutation, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 283, 288 (1996)
(abused men on death row unlikely to have stories heara as women's may be heard);
cf Janet C. Hoeffel, The Gender Gap: Revealing Inequities in A'dmission of Social
Science Evidence in Criminal Cases, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 41 (2001)
(arguing that courts routinely deny to typically male and African American criminal
defendants the same quality of evidence admitted for victimized women).
94 See ESTHER MADRIZ, NOTHING BAD HAPPENS TO GOOD GIRLS: FEAR OF
CRIME IN WOMEN'S LIVES (1997).
95 Perhaps ironically, much of women's vulnerability to crime is hidden from offi-
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many women's aspirations to femininity.96
Ordinary citizens participate in capital punishment policy not
only as voters or respondents to pollsters, but also as jurors who
make the life-or-death decision in capital cases. 97 The decision to
impose death is presented as a serious duty, one that takes courage,98 a masculine virtue that men and women on the jury are
invited to use. Women of all races and men of color are underrepresented on death-qualified juries, that is, juries from which
people who would not impose death are eliminated. 99 Perhaps
the saddest evidence of women as outsiders to capital punishment is the recent social science data suggesting that the presence of women on capital juries has no impact on the outcomes
of capital cases.lOO The life or death decision is more likely to be
cial statistics, in part because it is routine and legitimized. Britton, supra note 41, at
68. Again, however, the isolation of gender from race and class distorts this information. According to official statistics, women, compared to men, are underrepresented as victims of crime. Id. at 63-64. This un-raced category of "women"
submerges important racial differences: African American women are more likely
than White women to be victims of all kinds of violent crimes, with victimization
rates that approximate White men's. African American women are more likely than
White men to be victims of homicide. Id. at 64. African American men's rates of
homicide victimization are eight times higher than White men's. Id. Thus endorsement of capital punishment as policy appears not to correlate with real or perceived
increased risks of criminal victimization. Official statistics, of course, reflect class
and racial bias in policing.
96 See Howarth, Deciding to Kill, supra note 5, at 1363 (suggesting that women
may be less likely to qualify for capital juries because the readiness to inflict violence
conflicts with feminine identities) ..
97 See generally id.
98 For example, the jurors in Timothy McVeigh's case were told by the prosecutor
to "look into the eyes of a coward and tell him you will have courage." LIFTON &
MITCHELL, supra note 16, at 147.
99 Valerie P. Hans, Death by Jury, in CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LEGAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE ApPROACHES (Kenneth C. Haas & James A. Inciardi
eds.,1998). "Jurors who survive death qualification are demographically distinctive:
They are more likely to be male, to be White, to be well off financially, to be Republican, and to be Protestant or Catholic." Id. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719
(1992) (upholding the exclusion of potential jurors who acknowledge that they will
automatically vote for death, which might serve to exclude disporportionate numbers of White men); Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 231 n.9 (8th Cir. 1985) (Blacks
subject to "systematic disproportionate removal"), overruled sub nom. Lockhart v.
McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986); People v. Fields, 673 P.2d 680, 692 n.7 (Cal. 1983), cert
denied, 469 U.S. 892 (1984) (potential disproportionate exclusion of women and
Blacks alleviated by practice of also excluding automatic voters for the death penalty, assumed to be more male and White).
100 William J. Bowers et aI., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical
Analysis of the Role of Jurors' Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 171, 196 (2001).
Why is it that the number of black women or white women on the jury did
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determined by the race of the men on the jury. Specifically, in
cases with a Black defendant and a White victim, the presence of
five or more White male jurors "dramatically increased the likelihood of a death sentence." The presence of even a single Black
male juror "substantially reduced the likelihood of a death sentence" in these cases. IOI Researchers have not found any impact
from the participation of women of any race as capital jurors. I02
Of course, in our current era of formal gender equality in which
women should not be categorically excluded, the presence of women on the capital jury has a legitimizing role, whatever their
impact on the decision being reached.
Thus, today both men and women implement the masculine
enterprise of the death penalty. The mechanics of executions
have become less overtly violent and less gruesome, and, in our
era of formal gender neutrality, many women have proven themselves man enough to participate. Women who participate easily
adapt to the masculinity of the enterprise; an execution ordered
by a woman is no less lethal, but the woman has proven her
toughness. Like Dianne Feinstein, women may earn legitimacy
for participation or even leadership in public life in part through
the willingness to execute. In those cases, the masculinity of the
death penalty empowers the woman, more than the woman
changes the masculinity in executing the death penalty. Conversely, women may be particularly vulnerable to being vilified
as too soft on crime and ousted from public leadership by prodeath penalty forces, as in the prominent cases of former California Supreme Court Chief Justice Rose Bird and former Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny White. I03 Even in an era when
not appreciably affect the likelihood of a death sentence is uncertain at this
point? There is ample evidence that women behave differently in group
interaction and group decision settings and that they are more reserved and
less confrontational than men. But whatever female jurors add to the dynamics of jury deliberations, it did not appear to influence the sentencing
outcomes significantly toward death or life.
/d.
101
102

[d. at 195.
[d. at 196.

103 Conversely, women may be particularly vulnerable to being vilified as "soft on
crime" and ousted from political life by pro-death penalty forces. See, e.g., John
Blume & Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death Penalty Appeals, and Case
Selection: An Empirical Study, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 465, 470-74 (1999) (discussing
votes ousting former California Supreme Court Justice Rose Elizabeth Bird and
Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny White); Mark Hansen, A Run for the
Bench, 84 A.B.A. J. 68 (1998) (same).
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no formal exclusions prevent women from public leadership, the
deeply masculine imperative of capital punishment makes it an
issue perhaps uniquely capable of policing women by returning
women found too soft to the private sphere where femininity
more easily resides.
II
GENDERING THE CONDEMNED

The gendering of capital punishment is, of course, profoundly
intertwined not only with the gender of those who carry it out,
but also of those being punished. Capital punishment is usually
men killing men. The biological sex may change without dislodging the masculinity of the operation; putting someone to death is
masculine work, whoever does it. Being put to death is overwhelmingly man's work too, but some women have been found
fit for the role throughout history. Although the biological sex of
the condemned prisoner is not determinative, the masculinity of
the enterprise may be disrupted when the object of the execution
is perceptibly and appropriately feminine, that is, a feminine female. Proper femininity is found more easily in White women
than in women of color, in heterosexual women instead of lesbians, and in middle-class rather than poor women. However, this
kind of profound and complex gender significance is largely hidden behind the current dominant version of gender equality
under the law.
Although gender is much more fluid and complex than a simple dichotomy of biological male or female, our law hides the
messy complexities of gender behind the simple dualism of biological men and women, and the requirement of formal equality
between the two. Thus, the legal issue of gender in the death
penalty is popularly understood as the question of women on
death row, and, more specifically, whether male and female capital defendants are treated the same. Although not the complete
picture, those questions offer an apt starting place to consider the
gender of the capital defendant.
A.

The Capital Critique of Formal Equality

Through alignments of timing, the modern, post-Furman death
penalty era has also been the era of formal gender equality, the
principle by which our laws now struggle for coherence and con-
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trol over sex and gender. 104 This looming legal standard, our official story, contends that the state should treat women and men
alike. The history of public opinion related to women being executed does not establish a relentless march toward gender neutrality. In 1937, Gallop polls registered no difference in the level
of support for the death penalty in general (fifty-eight percent) as
for the death penalty imposed on women (also fifty-eight percent).105 The same questions asked in 1953, shortly after the execution of Ethel Rosenberg,106 revealed that only seventy-five
percent of the people who supported the death penalty in general
supported it for women.107 By 1991, ninety-five percent of those
who favored the death penalty for a "man convicted of murder"
also favored it for a "woman convicted of mutder."108 The era of
formal gender equality had arrived.
Formal gender equality purports to promote equality by conceiving of and producing gender as an individual attribute that
can and should be isolated and ignored. As extensive feminist
literature makes clear, formal equality uses the man as the standard for comparison,109 ignores the profound differences in the
ways that women live, and thereby strengthens the power disparities that many feminists see at the core of gender rules yo Embrace of formal equality is one explanation for the persistent and
104 Phyllis Crocker made this point in Feminism and Defending Men on Death
Row, supra note 30, at 981-82. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), reinstated the
death penalty in 1976. Leading cases finding that the Equal Protection Clause requires formal gender equality included Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)
and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). See also Rapaport, Damned, supra note
30, at 588 (noting the confluence of gender equality and post-Furman death penalty
world).
105 Ellsworth & Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes, supra note 18, at 38-39 (citing
to Gallup polling that in 1937, fifty-eight percent of the population supported the
death penalty for women and the same percentage supported the death penalty
generally).
106 Gross, Update, supra note 57, at 1465. That controversial execution of a wife
and mother may have influenced public opinion in ways similar to the execution
forty-five years later of Karla Faye Tucker. See infra text accompanying notes 172,
197-99 (discussing impact on public opinion of Karla Faye Tucker's execution).
107 In 1953, support for the death penalty generally had risen to sixty-eight percent, but only fifty-one percent supported it for women. Ellsworth & Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes, supra note 18.
108 Gross, Update, supra note 57, at 1466 (showing that sixty-three percent answered affirmatively about imposing the death penalty on a woman, compared to
sixty-six percent in general).
109 CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSE ON LIFE
AND LAW 34 (1987).
110 For a generous partial rehabilitation of formal equality, see Mary Anne Case,
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shallow association of feminist reform with retributive policies. I I I
The isolation of gender hides differences among women, especially those related to class and race, such as the dramatically
different arrest rates for White and African American women. 112
As many have suggested, formal equality has turned out to be
best for women whose resumes are most like men's, and consequently has hindered other women in custody battles for their
children or maintenance of their standard of living after a divorce. Formal gender equality has meant harsher sentences for
women. II3 We seem comfortable upholding a vast gulf between
the stated premises of formal equality of the law (men and women should be treated identically because they are the same) and
the widespread culture of differences between the lives of men
and women, including dramatic inequaiitiesP4 As Mary Anne
Case suggests, "what [the Court] has required is not that the proThe Very Stereotype the Law Condemns: Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a
Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447 (2000).
III For criticism of feminist criminal justice policy reforms, see Dianne L. Martin,
Retribution Revisited: A Reconsideration of Feminist Criminal Law Reform Strategies, 36 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 151 (1998). For a critique of damage wreaked by formal gender equality in criminal law, see Britton, supra note 41, at 57. See generally
Angela Davis & Gina Dent, Conversations: Prison as a Border: A Conversation on
Gender, Globalization, and Punishment, 26 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC'y
1235 (2001). Angela Davis criticizes the impact of formal gender equality on women
prisoners, decrying
the strange but predictable way feminism has been embraced by custodial
hierarchies. The demand for more women guards and high-level officers
has been complemented by the demand to treat women prisoners the same
as men prisoners. . .. Thus putatively feminist positions have bolstered the
trend toward more repressive imprisonment practices for women and specifically the move from the cottage/campus architectural model to the concrete fortresses being constructed today. An interesting example of this
feminism that demands formal equality of men and women prisoners is
some wardens' insistence that women prisoners have the right to be considered every bit as dangerous as men.
/d. at 1239. Further, a former woman warden successfully "lobbied for the right to
shoot at women escapees." /d.; see also Meda Chesney-Lind & Joycelyn M. Pollock,
Women's Prisons: Equality with a Vengeance, in WOMEN, LAW, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 155,167 (Alida V. Merlo & Joycelyn M. Pollock eds., 1995) (arguing that making women's prisons more like men's was initially beneficial to the women prisoners
but ultimately worsened their conditions of confinement).
112 See, e.g., Britton, supra note 41, at 60 ("for some offenses ... arrest rates for
African American women most closely match those for white men.").
113 See Daly & Tonry, supra note 41, at 205.
114 Our self-image of gender equality is quite a feat in an era when women
still do eighty percent of childcare and two-thirds of the housework; when
ninety-two percent of mothers do not work the kind of overtime required
by many of the best jobs; when ninety-five percent of upper-level manage-
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tection be equal, but that the rule be the same."lI5
Formal equality becomes incoherent when addressing supposedly116 real biological differences between men and women (i.e.,
pregnancy, postpartum depression, menopause), but otherwise
the rules for women and for men are supposed to be the same.
Thus, the law is that sex is irrelevant in such areas as hiring, punishment, and benefits, except when it cannot be, because of biologyY7 This non-differentiation principle, or formal equality, is
the rule through which courts judge capital cases, and the political backdrop to decisions about clemency. In other words, formal equality requires that, unless they are pregnant, women face
the death penalty exactly as do men. The imbedded masculinity
of capital punishment complicates this directive in multiple ways.
B.

"Warfare Writ Small"

For all the militaristic rhetoric that surrounds criminal justice
(i.e., "war on crime," "war on drugs"), the death penalty is the
only domestic punishment in which killing is a deliberate policy.
Therefore executions and warfare may share similarly deepseated yet false knowledge about manhood and womanhood.
Our judges have not had the will to enforce formal gender
equality in the important cultural performance of masculinity
that is the military.lI8 A combat exclusion for women still exists,
ment, and a similar percentage of the best blue-collar jobs, are held by
men.
Joan Williams, From Difference to Dominance to Domesticity: Care as Work, Gen·
der as Tradition, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1441, 1471 (2001).
115 Case, supra note 110, at 1474. The gender neutrality of formal equality offers
so little that we might follow Mary Anne Case in describing it instead as the normative principle that "sex should be irrelevant to an individual's treatment by the law."
Id. at 1473.
116 See, e.g., BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 21, at 6-7 (defining the gender of sex itself).
117 See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (upholding statutory distinction
between foreign-born non-marital children of citizen fathers and those of citizen
mothers on the basis of biological difference between fathers and mothers); Michael
M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding statutory
rape provision that applied only to males on the basis that females were sufficiently
deterred by risk of pregnancy).
118 For important commentary on the "maleness" of the military, see Martha
Chamallas, The New Gender Panic: Reflections on Sex Scandals and the Military, 83
MINN. L. REV. 305 (1998); Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499, 501 (1991) [hereinafter
Karst, Manhood]; see also Judith Gardam, Gender and Non-Combatant Immunity, 3
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 345 (1993) (describing ways in which the law of
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although it is much reduced, ll9 and the male-only registration of
eighteen-year-olds for the draft has been upheld by the Supreme
Court. 120 What happened to the principle that men and women
must be treated the same? Kenneth Karst has an answer: "Masculinity is traditionally defined around the idea of power; the
armed forces are the nation's preeminent symbol of power."121
The exclusion of women from mandatory registration and
some combat roles protects masculinities in the guise of protecting women. 122 Similar impulses may operate in capital punishment; after all, "[c]apital punishment is warfare writ sma11."123
Gender performance is contextual, fluid, and contingent; the
masculinities in the death penalty undoubtedly disrupt the demands of formal gender equality differently than do the masculinities of war. For example, any comparison of gender in the
military and in the death penalty requires determining the extent
to which the military exclusions of women are designed to prevent women from being killed, or to prevent women from being
killers. The combat soldier embodies both those possibilities;
capital punishment separates them, provoking the question
whether the percentage of women executioners is any different
armed combat is structured by a gendered distinction between combatants (masculine warriors) and non-combatants (often understood to be women)}.
119 See BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES
AND MATERIALS 1104-06 (4th ed. 2000).
120 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
121 Karst, Manhood, supra note 118, at 501. Wendy Williams provided a similar
analysis:
What does our culture identify as quintessentially masculine? Where is the
locus of traditional masculine pride and self-identity? What can we identify in men's cultural experience that most divides it from women's cultural
experience? Surely, one rather indisputable answer to that question is
"war": physical combat and its modern equivalents.
Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections On Culture, Courts, and
Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175, 183 (1982). For proof of the cultural anxiety about emasculation of the military, see STEPHANIE GUTMANN, THE KINDER,
GENTLER MILITARY: CAN AMERICA'S GENDER-NEUTRAL FIGHTING FORCE STILL
WIN WARS (2000); see also Mark M. Hager, C.I. Jane and the Limits of Liberalism,
10 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219, 221 (2000) (using Gutmann's work as a
platform for "reflection on the relationships of equality, sex roles, military issues,
and social control in a liberal society").
122 Karst, Women, supra note 8, at 624 (quoting Michael Wright, The Marine
Corps Faces the Future, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,1982, § 6 (Magazine), at 16,74 (quoting General Robert H. Barrow». One former Commandant of the Marines explained that allowing women in combat "tramples the male ego. When you come
right down to it, you have to protect the manliness of war." Id.
123 Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1741, 1764 (1987).
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from the percentage of women who are on death row. 124
Significantly, the combat exclusion is a categorical exclusion
from a certain kind of employment. The gender-based draft registration of eighteen-year-old men is a formal, categorical, positive law exemption of young women from an important duty to
our country. Women's inclusion among the condemned is not
barred by a similar structure of transparent and explicit categorical exclusions, but instead is controlled by facially neutral yet
gendered eligibility statutes and isolated, discretionary determinations of individuals working the death penalty machinery. William Buckley's proposal notwithstanding,125 the public does not
want a formal exemption to prevent executions of women, perhaps because convicted murderers do not receive the same level
of protection as eighteen-year-old daughters of all races and classes, and perhaps because the informal discretionary mechanisms
are sufficient to protect the masculinity of the death penalty.
Even without any formal exclusion of women, death row is overwhelmingly male.
C.

The Masculinist Cycle of Male Killing Male
Death row today is filled with 3717 126 nameless, faceless men.
Males arrested for murder are six times more likely to be sentenced to death than females arrested for murder. 127 We see gender more easily in the cases of women on death row,128 but
124 In the film Monster's Ball, one of the execution team is a woman. Her· job,
checking the identifications of the witnesses, positions her with the witnesses, not
the participants, and Hank checks to make sure that she is alright. MONSTER'S
BALL, supra note 77. Ivan Solotoroff's recent book about executioners does not
mention any women executioners. See IVAN SOLOTAROFF, THE LAST FACE YOU'LL
EVER SEE: THE PRIVATE LIFE OF THE AMERICAN DEATH' PENALTY (2001).
125 See William F. Buckley, Jr., Miss Tucker's Plea, NAT'L REV.; Mar. 9, 1998, at
71 (discussing the "quite understandable reluctance to execute women" but finding
that "revival of the idea of special protection contends against the tidal wave of
equality"). Buckley has recommended that we borrow from the combat exclusion a
formal exclusion from executions in order to avoid the "terribly taxing" reality of
pleas based on sex from each of the women on death row. [d. In suggesting a
formal immunity, Buckley is (probably unwittingly) borrowing from the former Soviet and current Russian capital punishment regimes.
126 Death Row U.S.A., supra note 7, at 3.
127 Streib, Gendering, supra note 5, at 442.
128 Cf Devon W. Carbado, Straight Out of the Closet, 15 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
LJ. 76, 86 (2000).
Generally speaking, men do not perceive themselves to be en-gendered.
Gender, for men, is a term that relates to women and women's experiences;
it is synonymous with "female." Thus, men have not paid much attention
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gender is just as powerful a force, maybe a more powerful force,
in the cases of all the men, who sit ondeath rqw . . '
Manliness can be established by bettering other men. 129 The
crimes considered most worthy of the death penalty are the
crimes of men. Elizabeth Rapaport argues convincingly that the
main explanation for the maleness of death row is choices about
which crimes merit death: "It is the extremely low rate of participation in death penalty echelon crimes that most powerfully explains the low percentage of women on death roW."130 The
choice to execute men has not been enacted by statutes limiting
the death penalty to serial killers, most of whom are White
men,131 but is instead grounded in the legislative policy to expand
the scope of capital murders to the category that includes the
majority of first degree murders, felony murder. 132 The vast majority of felony murders, such as the killing of a person behind
the counter in a convenience store robbery, are committed by
men, not by women. The inclusion of felony murders within
death penalty statutes almost guarantees that most condemned
are men.
Death-eligibility choices are, of course, themselves deeply
gendered. Men and women commit different murders; the felony
murders of men are the highest percentage of capital cases; the
domestic murders that women commit generally are not considto the ways in which the social constructions of gender shape and define
men's experiences as men.

ld.
129 Harris, supra note 10, at 779-80. ("Exploration of the violence in the criminal
justice system-the violence of both private and public actors-begins to reveal the
extent to which masculine identity is shaped by relations of repulsion and desire
between men.").
130 Rapaport, Damned, supra note 30, at 583; Rapaport, Domestic Discount,
supra note 30; Rapaport, Gender Discrimination, supra note 30.
131 See Jack Levin & James Alan Fox, Female Serial Killers, in FEMALE CRIMINALITY: THE STATE OF THE ART 249, 250 (Concetta C. Culliver ed., 1993) ("lYpically, serial killers are white males in their late 20's or 30's .... "); but see Candice
Skrapec, The Female Serial Killer: An Evolving Criminality, in MOVING TARGETS:
WOMEN, MURDER AND REPRESENTATIONS 241, 243 (Helen Birch ed., 1994) (suggesting that women account for close to the same percentage of serial murders as of
murder (twelve to fifteen percent)).
132 See Rapaport, Domestic Discount, supra note 30, at 510 (supporting claim that
seventy-five percent of capital murders are felony murders); Steven F. Shatz & Nina
Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1283 (1997) (discussing impact of making felony murders death-eligible,
thereby making most murders death eligible).
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ered death-worthy.133 The fact that domestic murders are not
punished as severely as other murders means that many people
who kill women are not considered as blameworthy as other
murderers, given that women are over-represented as victims of
domestic murders. 134 Gender operates in these assessments of
which categories of murders are considered most terrible, but the
low number of women on death row does not itself create some
sort of prima facie case of prosecutorial discrimination against
men in application of the capital statutes; rather, the gender bias
is built into the statutes.
The relative infrequency with which women are sentenced to
death does not constitute evidence of discrimination against men.
Executions of women transgress taboos against certain kinds of
public violence against women,135 but even that reluctance is not
offered to all women. We take care of some women, some of the
time. Wanda Jean Allen's life, and most of Karla Faye Tucker's,
were themselves dramatic refutation of the idea that women are
protected by chivalry, placed on a pedestal, or taken care ofP6
Most of the women charged with capital murder are not sufficiently feminine-because of poverty, mental illness, race, or the
violent agency of the crime of which they are accused, to earn the
full protection of womanhood through informal immunity from
being charged as capital defendants. 137
Rapaport, Domestic Discount, supra note 30.
[d. at 1512.
.
135 Heberle, supra note 30, at 1103. ("While the state-sanctioned killing of women has yet to be normalized, women's bodies as sexualized objects have been regarded as the appropriate targets of extralegal violence and as undeserving of the
full protections of the state.").
136 Wanda Jean Allen, a poor, African American lesbian executed by Oklahoma
in 2001, and Kayla Faye Tucker are discussed infra in text accompanying notes 16667,178.
137 But see Streib, Gendering, supra note 5; Andrea Shapiro, Unequal Before the
Law: Men, Women, and the Death Penalty, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'y & L.
427 (2000).
At any rate, the Court's refusal to engage a race discrimination claim without
evidence of intent to discriminate specific to a particular case seems to foreclose
successful gender attacks based on statistical evidence. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279 (1987). Indeed, Justice Powell explicitly rejected the race claim in part
because it could also invite "even" gender claims. [d. at 317. That is, one reason to
block claims of systemic race discrimination was to foreclose claims of systemic gender discrimination.
Although Constitutional law draws us into such comparisons, analogies between
gender and race are rarely useful. Such comparisons oversimplify both race and
gender, reinforcing the false notion that they are separate, and the equally false
notion that they somehow have equivalent meanings, histories, or contexts. See STE133
134
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Women charged with capital murder might have earned punishment through gender transgression in addition to the formalities of the crimes for which they have been convicted. 138 Some
women on death row seem to represent the gender transgressions of a woman appropriating male roles. Karla Faye Tucker,
who gloried in the sexual excitement of her pickaxe killings,
seemed to fit that category. Other women embody the danger of
a stereo typically female role gone bad, such as the many women
on death row who killed their husbands (dangerous wives)139 and
mothers who killed their children (bad mothers).14o
Although the number of women on death row is so small that
virtually nothing in terms of verifiable social science data is possible, we can see a growing number of women on death row because of killing children. Dangerous wives and bad mothers
embody twisted versions of a symbolically female role. If executions generally are a sign of taking control over social disorder,
PHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 85-102 (1996). Even if they could be separated, the meanings
of race and gender in criminal justice would be spectacularly asymmetrical. See
Daly & Tonry, supra note 41. In addition, our public rhetoric of gender is very
different from that of race. Sex can be noticed and spoken of in ways that race is
not. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (" 'Inherent differences'
between men and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration."); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reI. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 149 (1994), J. O'Connor, concurring ("one need not be a sexist to share the intuition that in certain cases a
person's gender and resulting life experiences will be relevant to his or her view of
the case."); see also Carri Geer Thevenot, Women Convicted of Killing Stepdaughter
Sentenced to Life in Prison, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Feb. 21, 2002, at B1 (expressly
comparing the three female defendants he had sentenced for homicide, sentencing
judge declared this defendant "the worst of the lot"). This willingness to express
rather than silence gendered comparisons might help to reveal the evidence of intentional gender bias operating in an specific case apparently required by McCleskey.
To make a discrimination claim on behalf of a male capital defendant, the sex of the
defendant would have to be noteworthy and commented upon. But such comments
are highly unlikely, because the sex and gender of most capital defendants is as
unremarkable as the fact that the receptionist is a young woman. Most capital defendants are simply more men, in a sea of men.
138 See Howarth, Feminism, supra note 9, at 402. See generally Jenny E. Carroll,
Note, Images of Women and Capital Sentencing Among Female Offenders: Exploring the Outer Limits of the Eighth Amendment and Articulated Theories of Justice, 75
TEX. L. REV. 1413 (1997) (discussing death penalty for transgressive women).
139 Professor Victor Streib reports that thirteen women who killed their husbands
are currently on death row, five of whom have been sentenced in the last four years.
Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Female Offenders; January 1, 1973, Through June
30, 2002, at 3, at http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/femdeath.htm (July 26, 2002)
[hereinafter Report: 1973-2002].
140 Ten women are on death row for killing their children, four of whom were
sentenced in the last four years. Id.
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executing these women might be understood as a gesture of taking control over gender disorder. 141 Even if most of the violence
of capital punishment is masculinities against masculinities, the
gender neutral legal regimen allows the execution of these particularly violent versions of womanhood. Or, perhaps, the docility
of wives and the self-sacrifice of mothers is so essential to those
roles that the deadly crimes render the condemned fundamentally masculine wives and mothers, that is, not really wives or
mothers at all.
These questions are· entwined with the gendered nature of
agency al!d autonomy. Capital punishment ratifies and reinforces the message that individuals are responsible for their actions. To the extent that capital punishment is supported on the
basis of notions of just desserts and retribution, the desired message is that people are responsible and therefore will be punished. 142 Women on death row undermine that theme, to the
extent that they are feminine subjects who are not understood to
be free, autonomous agents. 143 "Punishment ... involves imagining the object of vengeance to be a responsible agent who deserves whatever he gets, and, at the same time, a dangerous
monster with whom we must deal."144 Although feminine "monsters" are well-established in our cultural histories and personal
psychologies, the notion of "responsible agency" is deeply masculine. Are real wives and mothers understood to be free and
autonomous? Issues about executing women raise complex
problems, both de-stablizing and stablizing regimens of capital
141 Renee Heberle makes this point:
Society wonders whether women; as women, need to be rendered more
commonly subject to the disciplinary sanctions of the state, not in the name
of equality but in the name of managing the disorder engendered by unequal relations of power. The concern about women's immunity from society's worst sanction might be taken, accordingly, to indicate that other
forms of disciplining women are perceived as no longer adequate.
Heberle, supra note 30, at 1104.
142 "Capital punishment, after all, construes the condemned as having the will and
capacities proper to human beings." Norton, supra note 75, at 36.
143 On women's agency, see Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805 (1999); Kathryn
Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995).
144 Austin Sarat, The Cultural Life of Capital Punishment: Responsibility and
Representation in Dead Man Walking and Last Dance, in THE KILLING STATE,
supra note 60, at 227, 239 [hereinafter Sarat, The Cultural Life of Capital Punishment] (citing WILLIAM CONNOLLY, THE ETHOS OF PLURALIZATION 47 (1995».
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punishment. 145 Women on death row embody the conflict between formal equality of our legal system, and deep-seated cultural understandings of what it is to be a man and what it is to be
a woman.
Interestingly, as Elizabeth Rapaport has pointed out, bias in
favor of women is suggested by the rates of leaving death row,
whether by appellate reversaP46 or clemency.147 As to reversible
error on appeal, Rapaport suggests that "[h]igh as the incidence
of reversible error was found to be in death cases generally, it is
possible that the error rate in female death cases is higher
sti11."148 She posits that the relative rarity of women on death
row might give their cases the particular scrutiny reserved for
noteworthy cases, and suggests that further research may show
that women tend to benefit more than men from proportionality
review because women are less severe aggravators with fewer
prior crimes of violence. 149 Regarding clemency, Rapaport
shows that women have received a disproportionately high number of the post-Furman, merit-based grants of clemency-seven
of forty-four. 150
These numbers are not surprising. Harmlessness is more easily
discoverable in women than in men; violent crimes are more easily understood as aberrational,151 so redemption can be more
easily seen. Women are more easily understood, by themselves
and others, as victims. 152 Especially to the extent that mitigation
evidence suggests victimhood, women facing death sentences
might be more willing to allow such evidence to be investigated
145 The underlying message of responsibility and control is, of course, provoked
by and in constant tension with the experience of powerlessness that fuels the desire
for the death penalty.
146 Professor Rapaport uses the Liebman Study of error rates in capital cases,
1973-1995. See Rapaport, Staying Alive, supra note 30, at 976 n.38 (citing to James
S. Liebman et aI., A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, at
http://justice.policy.net/jpreportlfinrep.PDF (Mar. 13, 2001)).
147 Rapaport, Damned, supra note 30, at 583-88; Rapaport, Staying Alive, supra
note 30, at 976-84; see also LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 16, at xiii (describing
clemency granted by conservative Alabama Governor Fob James to a woman convicted of a particularly gruesome crime).
148 Rapaport, Staying Alive, supra note 30, at 979.
1491d. at 979-80.
150ld. at 981.
151 Cf Britton, supra note 41, at 60.
152 See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Stanko, Warnings to Women: Police Advice and Women's Safety in Britain, in CRIME CONTROL AND WOMEN, supra note 59, at 52
(describing particular consequences of association between women and
victimization ).
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and revealed. 1s3 To the extent that women are less likely to sustain the impression of being fully responsible for their acts, they
are more likely to be removed from death row. And perhaps
appellate courts and governors are able to act more like protective fathers,ls4 further removed from the shocking and frightening crime for which the woman has been condemned. In short,
feminine subjects will clean up better for the appellate and clemency processes. We should not be surprised that the lottery of
selection for execution might disfavor those who most easily sustain the masculinity of the enterprise.
Every female and male defendant is considered within unspoken but powerful constructions of masculinities and femininities.
Condemned women have forsaken their femininity, or perhaps
never had it, and thereby lose their claim to life. lss Men who are
on death row need to be punished precisely because of their masculine identity, wrapped up as it is with their class and racial
identities, chosen and imposed. 1 s6 Men on death row rarely
transgress their gender assignments. IS? If anything, they are condemned for embodying frighteningly fierce maSCUlinity, provoking condemnation especially from other, different, men. lss The
uneasiness with executing more women may be because capital
153 See Streib, Gendering, supra note 5, at 463 (decisionmakers might more easily
find sympathetic factors for women than for men, perhaps because women might be
less reluctant to expose these factors).
154 Mary Ellen Gale has identified "the patriarchal norm that assigns the task of
serious punishment both within and outside the family to persons acting as fathers
rather than mothers." Gale, supra note 41, at 737 n.194. Is the appellate court more
like a forgiving father? See Howarth, Deciding to Kill, supra note 5, at 1405-21
(describing "male" quality of judges contrasted with "female" juries). Perhaps clemency is an unusual amalgamation of feminine caring (mercy) with masculine authority. If so, the recent relative rarity of clemency grants may suggest a resurgence in
the masculine discipline of capital punishment. See Rapaport, Staying Alive, supra
note 30, at 967; see also Elizabeth Rapaport, Retribution and Redemption in the Operation of Executive Clemency, 74 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1501, 1506-07 (describing the
"timorous executive" of today's explanations for reluctance to use clemency power).
155 See Howarth, Feminism, supra note 9; see also Heberle, supra note 30, at
1106.
156 See generally Howarth, Black Male innocence, supra note 13, at 102-08 (discussing imposed and chosen identities, and links between them).
IS? An important exception is gay men, whose gender transgressions can put them
at risk for a death sentence. See, e.g., Missouri v. Lingar, 726 S.W.2d 728 (Mo.
1987).
158 Heberle, supra note 30, at 1105-06 ("When men commit violence in the private
sphere, they are in a sense fulfilling the grim assumptions society holds about masculinity. They do not have to be remasculinized to be considered redeemable or
'human.' Instead, judgment turns on whether they took their masculinity too far.").
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punishment is centrally about asserting, proving, and re-enacting
masculinities. In other words, changing the gender identity of
the person being executed changes the gender of the executioner 159 and of the execution.
If the death penalty consists mainly of gender violence of men
against men, feminine capital defendants who are women may
disrupt the meaning and power of the system. If executions are
mainly about taking some control over perceived lawlessness, the
person being executed has to have the qualities of being frightening and relatively easily de-humanized. Race, of course, is highly
relevant to both of these characteristics. Race matters; class matters; gender matters. Feminine subjects, not female bodies, confuse and disarm the symbolic machinery of death. To make
appropriately condemned, women need to have lost their femininity, whether through subordinated status or through their
actions.
These gendered tensions are manifested in the life or death
determination in each individual capital case.
D.

The Impossibility of Gender Neutral
Individualized Consideration

The fact that there are so many ways to be a woman-and
some females who are not even recognized as women-does not
suggest the casualness or unimportance of gender, but instead
proves the opposite, the need for powerful symbols and reinforcement of our identities. We live our own lives and we judge
others as performances of gender, or proof of gender. Thus, gender is a constant struggle, and the decision whether to execute a
capital defendant is in part a judgment about gender.
Capital cases are structured by a series of highly discretionary
decisions leading to life or death.160 The individualized sentenc159 For example, Alexander Cockburn stated that "Bush Jr. proved he was man
enough to kill a woman." Alexander Cockburn, A Day for the 'Hang 'em' Ghouls,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1998, at B9; see Streib, Gendering, supra note 5, at 34 ("To
bolster their manliness, they need to dispatch the toughest of male opponents; ...
executing a woman does not give them that masculine rush. To the contrary, it
stains them as 'guys who hit girls,' the ultimate wimps on the playground."); see also
THE GREEN MILE (Castle Rock Entertainment 1999) (film in which White executioner played by Tom Hanks is transformed by saintly condemned African American man).
160 For a discussion of the gender in the guided discretion of capital cases, see
Howarth, Deciding to Kill, supra note 5, at 1364-81.
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ing required by Woodson v. North Carolina 161 and Lockett v.
Ohio 162 mandates that each . defendant be' judged as a unique
human being, in light of his or her entire life experience, and that
no one's crimes require a death sentence. Is this a person who
deserves to live? Or is this person too dangerous to live? Is this
even a person, or an animal?163 Unlike an employment, housing,
or school admission decision, the entire life of the person can be
scrutinized. At trial the worthiness or culpability of the accused
is not formally compared with anyone else's, except perhaps the
victim's. The law provides no right answer.
This discretion, at charging, penalty phase, appellate level,
post-conviction stages, and clemency invites the social impulses,
biases, and other forms of socially constructed knowledge to
shape the narrowing process from death-eligible to executed. In
the penalty phase, we literally judge the value of a life, comparing the value of the defendant's life with the value of the victim's,
already lost. The extraordinary discretion provided to decisionmakers in capital cases leaves the gendered symbolic power
of capital punishment unrestrained.
In this life, we notice everybody's sex and gender. That is,
often the first things }Ve see about the person is whether a person
is male and recognizably and appropriately masculine, or female
and recognizably and appropriately feminine. We do not have
the capacity to ignore sex and gender in any kind of encounter,
unless it is rendered invisible because it is so ordinary. So, for
example, we do not necessarily notice that a receptionist is a woman; we would notice if she was a man, particularly an older,
distinguished man. How then; when it comes to judging a life, in
a capital case, could sex and gender not matter?
The foolish inadequacy of attempting t6 safeguard against discrimination by ignoring sex or gender can be seen in the federal
instruction and verdict certificate designed to eradicate sex or
gender bias in federal capital decisionmaking. The jury is instructed that the sex of the defendant cannot be considered, and
that "the jury is not to recommend a sentence of death unless it
has concluded that it would recommend a sentence of death for
161
162

428 U.S. 280 (1976).
438 U.S. 586 (1978). Death penalty schemes must enable consideration of
"any aspect of a defendant's character or record ... that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death." Id. at 604.
163 See Howarth, Black Male Innocence, supra note 13, at 136-38 (describing
racialized animals analogies in capital cases).
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the crime in question no matter what the ... sex of the defendant."164 As part of the verdict, each juror must supply a certificate pledging that he or she did not consider the sex (or any
other prohibited characteristic) of the offender. 165 Imagine the
difficulty of applying this formula in Karla Faye Tucker's case.
Karla Faye Tucker was brought into prostitution as a child by her
mother, and began taking drugs at age eight. 166 She dreamt of
being the first female quarterback in the National Football
League. At the age of ten, her older sister's boyfriend provided
her first heroin injection in the hope of sex. Like her mother,
Karla Faye Tucker learned to sell sex for money, drugs, and independence. Or consider Wanda Jean Allen, executed by
Oklahoma in 2001 for killing her woman lover. The jury that
condemned Wanda Jean Allen was told that she was the man in
the family.167 What would it mean to disregard her life as a woman? With whom could she be compared?
Imagine a jury asked to consider Andrea Yates without taking
into account her sex. 168 Andrea Yates, the Texan who faced a
death sentence for drowning her five children, has drawn ex164

18 U.S.c. § 3593(f) (1994).
Victor Streib advocates using this or a similar Instruction to minimize sex
bias in state capital cases. Streib, Gendering, supra note 5.
166 For a compelling account of Karla Faye Tucker's life, see BEVERLY LOWRY,
CROSSED OVER: A MURDER, A MEMOIR (1992). These descriptions of Karla Faye
Tucker's life are derived from this work; see also Howarth, Feminism, supra note 9
(describing Tucker's life).
167 See Allen v. State, 871 P.2d 79, 95 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert denied, 513 U.S.
952 (1994). For a description of Wanda Jean Allen's case, see Michael B. Shortnacy,
Comment, Guilty and Gay, A Recipe for Execution in American Courtrooms: Sexual
Orientation as a Tool for Prosecution of Misconduct in Death Penalty Cases, 51 AM.
U.L. REV. 309, 341-44 (2001).
168 Patricia J. Williams, Beyond the Village Pale, NATION, July 16, 2001, at 9 ("But
the Yates case revealed a deep gender divide about the isolation and stress of family
and motherhood in a society that extols self-sufficiency as its premiere human
value."); see also Anna Quindlen, Playing God on No Sleep, NEWSWEEK, July 2,
2001, at 64.
Every mother I've asked about the Yates case has the same reaction. She's
appalled; she's aghast. And then she gets this look. And the look says that
at some forbidden level she understands. The looks says that there are two
very different kinds of horror here. There is the unimaginable idea of the
killings. And then there is the entirely imaginable idea of going quietly
bonkers in the house with five kids under the age of 7.
[d. The fierce difficulty of mothering is not acceptable to acknowledge. "So that
when someone does something as horrifying as what Andrea Yates did, there is no
room for even a little bit of understanding." Anna Picard, Could You Too be a
Killer Mummy?, N. STATESMAN, July 9, 2001, at 29. "In Houston, there is little
liberal sympathy for a woman seen as having so many blessings. To many, Yates has
165 [d.
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traordinary public interest. The excitement might have related to
her position as a White, college-educated, middle class woman.
Andrea Yates' case riveted in part because she embodied conflictif.1g positions in our culture wars. Anti-feminists ridiculed
compassion for Yates,169 a fundamentalist Christian, anti-abortion, capital defendant whose crimes were bound up with home
schooling and relentless motherhood. In formal legal terms, assessing the appropriateness of a death verdict against Andrea
Yates should have been easy; mental illness reduces culpability.
Under a regime of supposed gender-blind equality, however, the
gendered source of her psychosis, post-partum depression, confused this simple truth, as if recognizing the mitigation in a
mental illness unique to women would mean impermissibly
favoring women. The cultural meaning of Andrea Yates' crime is
confused because her terrible crimes can be attributed to the
pressures of her life as a wife and mother. 170 Could any honest
person evaluating the case of Andrea Yates sign a certificate such
as that now required in federal capital cases171 verifying that the
sex of the defendant was not considered in the sentencing? The
gender-blind regime of formal equality obscures truths about women's lives while inviting unrestrained and unacknowledged attitudes about gender to impact life or death decisions.
Karla Faye Tucker's execution changed popular support for
destroyed the precious illusion that such murders are the province of poverty or
evil." Id.
In sex- and war-torn America, mothers who kill are seen as "getting away
with it" .... America is tired of the "hormonal" defense. It sounds too
menstrual, irrational, and self-indulgent. The feminists don't like it because it implies that women cannot think when they are bleeding or lactating. The "feminazi-haters" don't like it because it reminds them of their
mothers.
Id.
169 E.g., Ann Coulter, Stop Persecuting Andrea Yates!!!, HUMAN EVENTS, Sept.
10,2001, at 5 (satirical parody of supposed National Organization for Women letter
of support for Andrea Yates).
170 The complexities of knowing whether a woman is being helped or hurt by her
female identities can be seen in the public polling that showed forty-four percent of
the people polled supported execution of Andrea Yates, compared with seventyeight percent for Timothy McVeigh. The willingness of so many Americans to support death for a mentally ill Andrea Yates--where even the Houston prosecutor told
the jury that death was not required--is chilling. Paul, supra note 90, at 22 (fortyfour percent polled by Gallop supported execution of Andrea Yates, compared to
sixty-two percent for Juan Raul Garza and seventy-eight percent for Timothy
McVeigh).
171 See 18 U.S.c. § 3593(f).
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the death penalty in this country,l72 yet her execution has been
followed by six executions of women,173 none of which caused
any nationaP74 outcry, discomfort, or even much notice. If gender matters, how can the executions of Judy Buenoano, Betty
Lou Beets, Christina Riggs, Wanda Jean Allen, Marilyn Plantz,
and Lois Nadean Smith be explained? The explanation lies in
remembering that biological sex by. itself explains very little.
Gender is more than biology, and gender does not exist as separate from race or class or sexual identity.175 At least in this
world, a woman without a race cannot exist, so gender is not separate from race. 176 The gender identities continuously imposed
on and created by a professional Black woman are very different
from the gender identities or expectations imposed upon a poor
White woman. A speech about capital punishment entitled "The
Black Man's Burden"177 describes particular, highly contextual
manifestations of the meanings of African American manhood.
The fact that gender identities are not identical-in fact are
172 See, e.g., Paul, supra note 90, at 22 (identifying the execution of Karla Faye
Tucker as one of the reasons .for a reversal in 1998 of what had been thirty-years of
steady increases in .support for the death penalty and citing April 2001 poll conducted by ABC News and the Washington Post that found a majority of Americans
(fifty-one percent) supported a moratorium on the death penalty).
173 See Streib, Report: 1973-2001, supra note 139, at 4-5.
174 Outcry did occur in other countries. For example, "[a]n average person in
France could not help but be familiar with the case of Betty Lou Beets." Suzanne
Daley, Europeans Deplore Executions in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2000, at A8.
175 See, e.g. , Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 1241 (1991)
(describing intersections of gender and race); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet
Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 561, 641 (1997) (emphasizing inseparability and multidimensionality of race, gen<;ler, and sexuality); Peter Kwan, Jeffrey Dahmer and the
Cosynthesis of Categories, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1257, 1275-76, 1280 (1997) (emphasizing complex ways that race, gender, and sexuality constitute each other).
171f part of what it means to be a woman is not to be sentenced to death, the
womanhood of those who were executed was invisible before the law. That
the majority of women,who have been executed were Black reveals that
the protection of womanhood was really the protection of white womanhood. Barbara Smith explains that "[w]hen you read about Black women
being lynched, they aren't thinking of us as females. The horrors that we
have experienced have, absolutely everything to do with them not even
viewing us as women."
Howarth, Feminism, supra note 9, at 417 (quoting Barbara Smith, as quoted in ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST
THOUGHT 37 (1988)).
177 See Charles J . .ogletree, Jr., Black Man's Burden: Race and the Death Penalty
in America, 81 OR. L. REV. 115 (2002).
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hugely different from one man to another or from one woman to
another-does not· make them less powerful as constraints or
pressures on the material and imaginable choices of either women or men. Just the opposite is true.
Consider, for example, the gender of Karla Faye Tucker, when
executed by Texas in 1998, and the gender of Wanda Jean Allen,
one of three women executed by Oklahoma in 2001. 178 Karla
Faye Tucker was a White, articulate, charming, sweet, a~tractive,
devoutly heterosexual (married to a minister) woman. Wanda
Jean Allen was also religious, but her Christian identity was undercut by her lesbianism. Wanda Jean Allen was an African
American lesbian, described in her trial as "the man in the relationship." She was convicted and sentenced to die for killing her
lover in a domestic dispute. Allen and her partner were both
African American women who had met in prison while serving
homicide sentences.
We know that many Americans did not have the stomach for
the execution of an attractive, articulate, white, married (heterosexual), Christian woman. To add the modifiers is not to dilute
the importance of "woman"; the reaction to Karla Faye Tucker
does not make sense except as a reaction to a woman. The public
has not been interested in the many decent and likeable men on
death row who have transformed their lives through religious
conversion. 179
However, as Simone de Beauvoir famously advised us, women
are made, not born. Race, class, attractiveness, and gender-appropriate behavior make the woman, not biology. Karla Faye
Tucker herself understood that no one would have recognized
her as a woman at the time of her crime. 180 Although we have
too little social science data on the women of death row, one
study suggests that "death-sentenced women of color and lesbians are over-represented in the kinds of murders that, according
178 For a compelling account of Karla Faye Tucker, see Beverly Lowry, The Good
Bad Girl, N. YORKER, Feb. 9, 1998, at 60. Wanda Jean Allen is the subject of a
powerful documentary film, The Execution of Wanda Jean (HBO 2002). See also
Allen v. Oklahoma, 871 P.2d 79, 104-05, J. Lane, dissenting (dissenting from majority conclusion finding probative evidence that Allen was "man" in the relationship).
179 See, e.g. , LlFroN & MITCHELL, supra note 16, at 224. "Men who find religion
and lead decent lives on death row still carry with them the implicit threat of their
maleness." Howarth, Feminism, supra note 9, at 415.
180 "Had you seen me fourteen years ago, you wouldn't have called me a woman."
60 Minutes, Woman on Death Row Gets Support for the Christian Community (CBS
television broadcast, Dec. 7, 1997) (Karla Faye Tucker to Leslie Stahl).
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to prior research, are at low risk of resulting in the death penalty."181 Executing women who transgress feminine norms helps
to reaffirm those traditional norms of womanhood in the face of
pressures, including those of feminism. 182
Thus, gender is neither simple nor static. It is complex and
contingent; it can be lost. That is, some females are not seen as
women just as some males are not understood to be real men. We
cannot talk about gender without talking about race, class, age,
and other qualities. The gender-blind version of formal gender
equality, of course, sees none of those individual characteristics
or any others beyond biological assignment as male or female. 183
A narrow and simplistic focus on sex-executing some women
-will not de-stabilize capital punishment. Indeed, the focus on
women on death row helps to legitimize capital punishment.
When executions are in danger of being too routine to muster
much interest,184 any noteworthy executions help to sustain the
power of the death penalty. By being exceptional,185 women on
death row fortify the death penalty system by reminding us of the
individual cases, the horrible crimes, and our justification for
vengeance. 186 More particularly, if imposing death is understood
as performing a difficult duty, overcoming discomfort and apply181 Kathryn Ann Farr, Aggravating and Differentiating Factors in the Cases of
White and Minority Women on Death Row, 43 CRIME & DELINQ. 260 (1997).
182 See Howarth, Feminism, supra note 9; see also Kaufman-Osborn, Introduction, supra note 30, at 1100.
183 See, e.g., Kaufman-Osborn, Reviving, supra note 16, at 1122.
If a liberal regime is to make good on its promise of formal equality, if its
justice is to be truly blind, the body caught up within its legal complex must
become an abstraction, a being stripped all of the differentiating features
that make it this body rather than that one.
Id.; cf Joan W. Howarth, First and Last Chance: Looking for Lesbians in Fifties Bar
Cases, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 153 (1995) (discussing loss of rights
when courts confronted specific differentiating features of gay men and lesbians).
184 Sentencing is a signifying practice of some importance. Garland, supra note
38, at 200. "The importance of the communication-and the fact that it is a communication-is dramatically highlighted if the symbolic message that it contains is unexpected or in some way controversial." Id. at 199.
185 Rapaport, Damned, supra note 30 (discussing the salience of women on death
row).
186 Samuel Gross explains the public preference for very few actual executions in
part because of the need to notice each execution:
A single execution is not truly an act of revenge but it looks like revenge, it
symbolizes our desire and our willingness to seek vengeance. When we
single out one murderer we can focus on what he did to deserve death. But
if we were to conduct a hundred executions in close order we would lose
any illusion of individual vengeance; all we would see is mass killing by the
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ing the law "fairly" by executing women helps to legitimize capital punishment. Under an inoculation theory, we need to
execute some women to prove that gender is not a consideration. 187 (In what other public debate are we concerned with fairness to the condemned? Is this another manifestation of the
expendability of women?)
We might even understand that executing women can reinforce the masculinity of the death penalty, in reaction. In her
study of the Los Angeles Police Department, Janis Appier suggests that the presence of women as police officers had the paradoxical effect of masculinizing the police department; since the
1970's, police forces have become much more masculine, leaving
behind the greater service orientation of earlier eras, when officers performed caring tasks, including assisting children and
homeless people. 188 The renewed masculinity of capital punishment in the face of executions of women may relate to an anxious backlash, reasserting the masculinist power of executions in
the face of apparent weakness in killing women. Or, more directly, perhaps the direct masculinist impulse of undertaking the
duty of disciplining women who have gone too far is quite consistent with the masculinist impulse to vanquish other men.
The death penalty is relentlessly aimed at poor people, and
death judgments protect White lives. If the death penalty regime
is so successful at targeting those subordinated by class and race,
why not by sex? Perhaps even better than other spheres of public life, crime and punishment prove the impossibility of attempting to separate race, class, and gender and. then draw
comparisons between them. Race and gender in criminal justice
are spectacularly asymmetrica1. 189 Renee Heberle has suggested
that private violence against women fulfills the subordination
function against women that executions fulfill against poor men,
state, slaughter. The symbolism would change; the issue would now be the
nature of our society, our culture.
Gross, Romance, supra note 52 at 94; cf Sarat, The Cultural Life of Capital Punishment, supra note 144, at 248 (finding that the films Dead Man Walking and Last
Dance legitimize capital punishment by their "biographical focus" and "by insisting
that all that counts is the question of responsibility").
187 For a similar argument, see Kaufman-Osborn, Reviving, supra note 16, at 1123
("the occasional state-sponsored killing of a woman materializes and so reinforces
the liberal ideal of equality before the law, a principle that is otherwise mocked by
the incredibly long odds against achieving this status.").
188 See generally, ApPIER, supra note 41.
189 See generally Daly & Tonry, supra note 41.
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especially men of COlOr. 190 The death penalty reinforces manliness through powerful, public violence against frightening, masculine men, but the meanings of public violence against feminine
subjects can be quite different. Most women who have been executed have not been proper feminine subjects. Most women we
have executed have not disrupted the masculinity of the
enterprise.

III
EXECUTING FEMININITIES: KARLA FAYE TUCKER

Consider again the dilemma of then-Governor Bush in determining whether to allow Karla Faye Tucker to live. His choice
was not difficult. The question whether any woman should have
her death sentence commuted is, of course, now inextricably
complicated by the formal requirement of gender blindness. By
allowing Karla Faye Tucker to be executed, Bush was able to
prove his commitment to fairness and equality and perform
toughness and masculinity. Bush wrapped himself in the duty of
the decision, much as jurors understand the decision to vote for
death as somehow compelled by duty.191 In his campaign autobiography, Bush presented himself as pained by the decision ("one
of the hardest things I have ever done"I92), but committed to the
principle of gender equality. "My responsibility is to ensure our
. laws are enforced fairly and evenly without preference or special
treatment. ,,193
Bush's decision to execute did not hurt him, as a supporter of
the death penalty, but it did have an impact on public support for
executions generally. The fact that it was politically safe for
190 Is femininity,

unlike race or class, beyond the controlling mechanisms of
the state? Or is it more likely that gender, as one axis of social relations of
inequality, simply does not require formalized state sanction as a means of
discipline at this point in its history? When gender is challenged, extralegal
violences, ranging from sexual harassment to rape and domestic violence,
do the same work that law's violence does in managing the potential instability inspired by racial and class subordination.
Heberle, supra note 30, at 1104 (footnote omitted).
191 See Howarth, Deciding to Kill, supra note 5.
192 GEORGE W. BUSH, A CHARGE TO KEEP 153-54 (1999). By this account, the
pain of the execution is appropriated by the person carrying it out. For a similar
stance, in which a Ninth Circuit judge presents his suffering (sleepless nights) in the
face of having to deal with (in his judgment) baseless appeals from death row prisoners, see Alex Kozinski, Tinkering With Death, N. YORKER, Feb. 10,1997, at 48.
193 BUSH, supra note 192, at 154.

Executing White Masculinities

225

then-Governor George W. Bush to deny clemency to Karla Faye
Tucker 194 did not mean that the public was easy with her execution. By presenting the execution as compelled by gender neutrality, then-Governor Bush exploited our widespread discomfort
with formalized, explicit exemptions for women, in spite of the
many profound differences between the lives of men and women,
many of which disadvantage women severely. Immediately prior
to the scheduled execution of Karla Faye Tucker, only three percent of those polled agreed that the execution should be cancelled because Tucker was a woman. 195 Those results reflect the
resistance to formalized categorical exclusions from executions
for women.
People did not want all women to be protected, but they did
not want to execute Karla Faye Tucker. 196 In spite of the reluctance to permit formal exemption on the basis of sex, Tucker's
execution was sufficiently controversial in the country, in Texas,
and even in Houston, to undermine support for capital punishment. In the period prior to her execution, a poll conducted by
the Dallas Morning News found that only forty-five percent of
Texans supported Tucker's execution, although seventy-five percent supported the death penalty.197 By another account, support for the death penalty among Texans fell from eighty-five
percent in 1994 to sixty-eight percent six weeks after Karla Faye
Tucker's execution. 198 Shortly after Karla Faye Tucker's execution, an ABC News and Washington Post poll found that a majority of Americans (fifty-one percent) supported a national
moratorium on the death penalty.199 If the death penalty law
cannot discriminate between the monstrous and the likeable,
some people do not want it.
Karla Faye Tucker's transformation was especially perverse in
194 For a discussion of that political safety, see Rapaport, Damned, supra note 30,
at 594-99.
195 Gross, Update, supra note 57, at 1466.
196 As Karla Faye Tucker's execution date drew close, less than half of the Texans
polled, forty-eight percent, supported the execution, although sixty-one percent of
those polled supported capital punishment as policy. Sam Howe Verhovek, Texas, in
First Time in 135 Years, is Set to Execute Woman, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1998, at AI.
197 Katz, supra note 61. A Houston Chronicle poll found that forty-eight percent
believed Tucker should be executed, twenty-four percent believed her sentence
should be commuted to life, and twenty-seven percent said they did not know
enough about her to make a decision. [d.
198 Kaufman-Osborn, Reviving, supra note 16, at 1120.
199 Paul, supra note 90, at 22.
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its reversed entanglings of killing and sexuality. The most masculine aspect of her shocking crime was her boast that she experienced sexual climax every time she swung the pickaxe into the
bodies. 2°O Her linking killing with sexual satisfaction marked
how far from feminine identity she had wandered. But, perhaps
alone among the women executed since 1976, by the time of her
execution, Karla Faye Tucker was conventionally attractive, a
person who exuded not just charm but also sex. Beverly Lowry
described meeting Tucker: "In that cold, walled-off setting, surrounded by cold, walled-off people, Karla Faye threw her head
back and guffawed-a hearty, full, genuine body-shaking guffaw-and I could see her direct, uncompromised, highly sexual
charm.,,201 Perhaps her execution was especially troubling because the extermination of a sexually desirable woman came dangerously close to something akin to a snuff film fantasy. Perhaps
that helps to explain the persistence of official (male) resistance
to even noticing, let alone acting favorably upon, Karla Faye
Tucker's womanhood.
Judith Butler has usefully deployed the notion of "drag": "The
performance of drag plays upon the distinction between the anatomy of the performer and the gender that is being performed."202
Some of Karla Faye Tucker's influence on public attitudes about
the death penalty was based on her performance as "drag"; by
the time of her execution, she was a criminal in drag as a superfeminine, likeable, attractive women. Or maybe she was really a
feminine person, with just one powerful masculine performance
to live down. Karla Faye Tucker's execution was a "gender parody"203 in ways that Wanda Jean Allen's and others' were not.
Karla Faye Tucker was troubling in part because even in her
resistance to special treatment,204 she presented herself as the
kind of woman who should be respected, should be helped. Part
See, e.g., Howarth, Feminism, supra note 9; Katz, supra note 61.
Lowry, supra note 178, at 61.
202 BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 21, at 137. Drag highlights the "radical contingency in the relation between sex and gender in the face of cultural configurations of causal unities that are regularly assumed to be natural and necessary."
Id. at 138.
203 Id. at 138.
204 "Either you believe in the death penalty for everybody or you don't believe in
it for anybody." Carol Rust, 'Gender Shouldn't be an Issue'; Death Row Inmate
Claims Responsibility for Crimes, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 14, 1997, at Al (quoting
Karla Faye Tucker). Karla Faye Tucker also stated "[g]ender shouldn't be an issue,
period." Id.
200
201
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of her charm and attractiveness was her desire not to be given
special protection as a woman. "I say gender should not play any
role in this at all."205 How feminine and self-sacrificing. This is
the kind of woman who merits respect, not the kind to be complaining about her lot or asking for special treatment. "Special
treatment" is serious, powerful coded language in U.S. culture
wars about racial justice, gay and lesbian rights, and women's
rights. Special treatment would be contrary to the formal equality paradigm within which we operate. Executing such a presentable, feminine, White woman undercut public support for the
death penalty. The act of killing such an agreeable and lovely
(feminine, White) person undercut the power of the execution.
Killing a grim old White woman or a poor African American lesbian can be· satisfying. But the death penalty should protect
White innocence, not kill it.
In at least one popular account of the execution of Karla Faye
Tucker, she was said to have broken the "glass ceiling" of the
death penalty. Bringing to capital punishment that phrase borrowed from feminist tales of discrimination in the workplace
trumpets the "equality" of the death penalty and thereby legitimizes it. Camille Paglia supported the execution, claiming to be
an "equal opportunity feminist."206 Again, we live in an era in
which formal equality between men and women-no special
treatment-is a dominant, controlling construct, both in law and
in popular consciousness.207 Confined to that construct, some
205 Daniel Pedersen, Praying for
206 Cockburn, supra note 159.

Time,

NEWSWEEK,

Feb. 2, 1998, at 66.

As an equity feminist, I believe that women cannot demand equal opportunities in society without also being ready to accept equal risks and responsi- .
bilities. Women should not ask for special protections based on genderon death row or on the battlefield, where women with the right level of
physical stamina and training should be sent into combat.
Camille Paglia, Ask Camille, at http://www.salon.com/col/pagI/1998/02/17pagI2.html
(last visited Mar. 16, 2002).
207 See Kathryn Abrams, The Constitution of Women, 48 ALA. L. REV. 861, 862
(1997) (discussing "constitutive" function of legal decisionmaking, that is the role of
law in furthering popular knowledge).
The law, in the course of fulfilling its prescriptive function, projects images
of the groups appearing before the Court. These images then shape the
way such groups are viewed by the larger society. Law in this sense performs a function analogous to that of political rhetoric or the imagery of
popular culture: it characterizes groups in ways that ultimately filter into
popular understandings and counteract, or reinforce, the assumptions and
stereotypes that already exist.
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feminists called for the execution of Karla Faye Tucker in order
not to set back women's progress.
We also heard some anti-feminists chortling or sneering over
the right to equal access to lethal injection that feminist politics
had earned for women. 208 Not otherwise known for his commitment to fairness to women or to death rows inmates, then-governcr George W. Bush embraced Karla Faye Tucker's execution
with anti-affirmative action rhetoric; "My responsibility is to
make sure our laws are enforced fairly and evenly without preference or special treatment."209
That version of feminism is not mine. My version of feminism
is something like this. Crime is constructed as masculine. The
socially constructed and endlessly reproduced identity of many
men, especially poor men, especially African American and Latino men, is that of a criminaI,2lO The continuing use of violence
and crime to construct masculinities is dangerous. Security and
justice are unlikely in a political economy in which racialized and
masculinist rituals of violence substitute for effective crime control policies. The deeply embedded associations between criminality and masculinities might mean that feminine criminal
subjects allow us to see the criminal person, and therefore the
causes and answers to crime. Women may be more easily separated from the crimes that they have committed. We should create justice for capital defendants by making each of them as
visible, as human, as was Karla Faye Tucker.
My feminist response is to present Karla Faye Tucker not as
exceptional because she was a woman, but as exceptional because her gender transformation gave her the ability to be
seen. 211 Karla Faye Tucker was a very unusual woman. By her
words and her face, she challenged important American misconId. Abrams acknowledges the popular dominance of formal gender equality, which
she calls "equality theory" or "liberal feminism." Id. at 867-68.
According to Abrams, formal gender equality "also advanced a notion--a notion
still treated as synonymous with the term 'feminist'--that women are pervasively
similar to men." Id.
208 "To disregard the question of gender in making sense of [Karla Faye Tucker's
execution] is to fail to understand why this media extravaganza elicited such barely
concealed glee from feminism's detractors." Kaufman-Osborn, Introduction, supra
note 30, at 1097.
209 Katz, supra note 61 (quoting statement released by Bush).
210 See, e.g., Howarth, Black Male Innocence, supra note 13 (discussing social
constructions associating men of color with criminality).
211 Karla Faye Tucker promoted her own case in similar terms.
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ceptions about crime, rehabilitation, and capital punishment.
She seemed like a criminal when she was charged: poor, strung
out, arrogant, lethal, sexually dangerous. Her crude, brutal crime
was all the more shocking because she was a woman. Her transformation allowed America to see her as somebody who did not
seem like a criminal. By the time of her execution, she seemed
redeemed. She was faithful, sweet, pious, and articulate. There
was no question of future dangerousness. Karla Faye Tucker was
so thoroughly feminine that even her choice of a last meal-"Banana, Peach and Garden Salad with Ranch Dressing"-is starkly
abberational amidst the usual steaks, burgers, and pizzas on the
list of final meal requests published by the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice. 212 For those not titillated, the senselessness of
Karla Faye Tucker's execution was easy to see. Her execution
became a formal duty, justified by fairness to everyone else on
death row.
Because of the crimes for which they have been convicted, and
because of entrenched systems of subordination that selected
them for the ultimate punishment, most capital defendants do
not have the capacity to be valued by disinterested strangers.
Through an accident of gender transformation-gaining a striking feminine attractiveness-Karla Faye Tucker had that capacity. My version of feminism says that we honor women, we
honor ourselves, not by pretending not to care about Karla Faye
Tucker, but by using the lesson of our caring about her to learn to
care about the others on death row, the fifty-four women and
3717 men of all races,213 whether illiterate, ugly, miserable, or
frightening, whose executions would be just as senseless as was
hers.

212 Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, Final Meal Requests, at http://
www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/finalmea!s.htm (last visited July 11, 2002).
213 Death Row U.S.A., supra note 7, at 3. They are 1593 African Americans, 347
Latinos/as, 41 Asians, 41 Native Americans, and 1678 Whites. !d.

